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EAGLES, INDIAN TRIBES, AND THE FREE 
EXERCISE OF RELIGION 
Kathryn E. Kovacs∗ 
The Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act prohibits the taking 
or possession of eagles and eagle parts. Recognizing the centrality of 
eagles in many Native American religions, Congress carved out an 
exception to that prohibition for “the religious purposes of Indian 
tribes.” The problems with the administration of that exception are 
reaching crisis proportions. At the Fish and Wildlife Service’s 
National Eagle Repository, which collects dead eagles from around 
the country and distributes them to members of federally recognized 
Indian tribes, more than six thousand tribal members are on a 
waiting list for eagles. That list grows each year. Frustration with 
the current system feeds a burgeoning black market that threatens 
the viability of eagle populations. Neither of the Eagle Act’s goals is 
being met: eagles are not adequately protected, and tribal religious 
needs are not satisfied. 
Scholarship in this area has neither fully elucidated the cross-
cutting tensions in the administration of the Eagle Act nor prescribed 
a realistic solution. This Article fills that gap. First, the Article 
examines a series of tensions: between species preservation and 
religious freedom; between accommodating the religious needs of 
tribal members and not accommodating others with the same 
religious needs; within the case law itself; and between the 
government’s effort to accommodate tribal religion and the deep 
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dissatisfaction of the tribal community. This Article then proposes a 
solution: changing the Fish and Wildlife Service’s administration of 
the exception from permitting individuals to permitting tribes and 
ultimately turning over much of the administration of the Indian 
tribes exception to the tribes acting collectively. The Article explains 
how scholarship on indigenous cultural property, community 
property solutions to the tragedy of the commons, and tribal self-
determination supports this proposal. Finally, the Article shows how 
this proposal will alleviate some of the tension in the administration 
of the Eagle Act’s Indian tribes exception. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act1 (the “Eagle Act” or 
“Act”) prohibits the taking or possession of eagles and eagle parts. 
Its purpose is to protect eagles.2 But eagles play a critical role in 
many Native American religions. They serve as a link between the 
physical and spiritual worlds, and their parts are required for 
religious ceremonies throughout the year and throughout one’s 
lifetime.3 Congress recognized the eagle’s significance in Native 
American religion and carved out an exception to the Eagle Act’s 
prohibition for “the religious purposes of Indian tribes.”4 Under that 
exception, the Fish and Wildlife Service’s National Eagle Repository 
collects dead eagles from around the country and distributes them to 
members of federally recognized Indian tribes.5 
The problems with the administration of the Eagle Act’s “Indian 
tribes” exception are reaching crisis proportions. The National Eagle 
Repository—the only legal source for new eagles and feathers in the 
United States—answers requests for a few feathers promptly. But 
tribal members who need a whole eagle (to perform the annual Sun 
Dance, for example) must wait years for their requests to be filled.6 
More than six thousand members of federally recognized Indian 
tribes are on the Repository’s waiting list for eagles.7 That list grows 
each year. The wait for a whole golden eagle is now more than four 
years.8 Frustration with the current system is feeding a burgeoning 
black market that threatens the viability of eagle populations.9 
Neither of the Eagle Act’s goals is being met: eagles are not 
adequately protected, and tribal religious needs are not satisfied.10 
The current administration of the Eagle Act is brimming with 
tension, perhaps because it falls at the intersection of a number of 
 
 1. 16 U.S.C. § 668 (2006). 
 2. United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 1122 (10th Cir. 2002) (en banc). 
 3. See infra Part III.A. 
 4. 16 U.S.C. § 668a (2006). 
 5. See infra Part II.A. 
 6. See infra note 157. 
 7. See infra note 159. 
 8. See infra note 157. 
 9. See infra note 168. 
 10. See infra Part III.A. 
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fundamental concerns: religious freedom, species protection, and 
tribal sovereignty. The primary difficulty, as is true for many natural 
resources, is scarcity. There simply is not a sufficient supply of 
eagles to satisfy the religious demand while preserving the viability 
of the species.11 To the extent that the demand for eagles grows out 
of religious belief, the Eagle Act pits species protection against 
religious freedom. One of the things that makes administering the 
Eagle Act particularly difficult, however, is the exception from the 
Act’s prohibition for “the religious purposes of Indian tribes.”12 The 
Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) implements that exception by 
issuing permits both to take eagles and to possess eagles and eagle 
parts to individual members of federally recognized Indian tribes.13 
That exception adds a layer of inequality to the clash between 
species preservation and religious freedom. It raises the question the 
Supreme Court asked in Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente 
União do Vegetal:14 If some people are exempted, why not others?15 
There is also tension within the case law itself. In a number of 
cases, individuals who are prosecuted for violating the Eagle Act’s 
prohibition or who bring civil claims challenging that prohibition 
contend that it violates their right to exercise their religion freely 
under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).16 The federal 
courts of appeals disagree about the government’s evidentiary burden 
in such cases and about which compelling interests the Eagle Act 
furthers.17 In addition, the current regulatory structure is unwieldy 
for the government and unsatisfying for the regulated community.18 
The FWS currently is tasked with reviewing thousands of permit 
applications each year and operating the National Eagle Repository 
(the “Repository”).19 Although the staff does an admirable job 
 
 11. See infra Part III.A. 
 12. 16 U.S.C. § 668a (2006). 
 13. 50 C.F.R. § 22.22(a) (2012). 
 14. 546 U.S. 418 (2006). 
 15. Id. at 436. 
 16. See infra Part II.C. The Supreme Court held RFRA unconstitutional as applied to the 
states in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), but RFRA still applies to the federal 
government. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(a) (2006); see also United States v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 
1274, 1279 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding the RFRA can be applied to the federal government); 
Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1067 n.10 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (“RFRA 
remains operative as to the federal government.”). 
 17. See infra Part III.C. 
 18. See infra Part III.A. 
 19. Id. 
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administering this program, tribal members remain dissatisfied with 
the application process, the wait to receive eagles from the 
Repository, and the quality of items they receive from the 
Repository.20 Finally, enforcing the Eagle Act’s prohibitions is too 
big a job for the FWS’s limited staff.21 Obviously, administrative 
change entails high transaction costs, but the current system is not 
sustainable. Eagle populations are not keeping pace with growing 
demand; tribal members are becoming increasingly frustrated with 
the current system; and the black market is blossoming. 
The many student notes22 and few scholarly articles23 on the 
Eagle Act have not prescribed realistic solutions, much less fully 
 
 20. Id. 
 21. See infra Part III.D. 
 22. See Brett Anderson, Recognizing Substance: Adoptees and Affiliates of Native American 
Tribes Claiming Free Exercise Rights, 7 WASH. & LEE RACE & ETHNIC ANC. L.J. 61 (2001) 
(arguing that tribes should be empowered to give eagle parts to nonmembers who are adopted by 
or affiliated with the tribe); Tina S. Boradiansky, Conflicting Values: The Religious Killing of 
Federally Protected Wildlife, 30 NAT. RESOURCES J. 709, 754 (1990) (“[I]ndividual freedom to 
seek religious gratification at the expense of another species may be an individual freedom which 
we can no longer afford.”); James R. Dalton, Comment, There Is Nothing Light About Feathers: 
Finding Form in the Jurisprudence of Native American Religious Exemptions, 2005 BYU L. REV. 
1575 (2005) (advocating giving tribes greater autonomy in administering the Indian tribes 
exception to the Eagle Act); Michael Davidson, United States v. Friday and the Future of Native 
American Religious Challenges to the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, 86 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 1133 (2008) (discussing avenues left open for Native American religious challenges to the 
Eagle Act after United States v. Friday); Amie Jamieson, Will Bald Eagles Remain Compelling 
Enough to Validate the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act After ESA Delisting? The Ninth 
Circuit’s Analysis in United States v. Antoine, 34 ENVTL. L. 929, 932 (2004) (arguing that courts 
should not consider the bald eagle’s status under the Endangered Species Act when evaluating the 
Eagle Act’s validity under RFRA); Stephen Rosecan, A Meaningful Presentation: Proposing a 
Less Restrictive Way to Distribute Eagle Feathers, 42 NEW ENG. L. REV. 891, 893 (2008) 
(advocating allowing tribal members to give feathers to nonmembers “who are actively involved 
in Native American religious practices”); Francis X. Santangelo, A Proposal for the Equal 
Protection of Non-Indians Practicing Native American Religions: Can the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act Finally Remove the Existing Deference Without a Difference?, 69 ST. JOHN’S L. 
REV. 255 (1995) (arguing that religious practitioners who are not tribal members should have the 
same access to eagles as tribal members and that RFRA will vindicate nonmembers’ claims). 
 23. See Antonia M. De Meo, Access to Eagles and Eagle Parts: Environmental Protection v. 
Native American Free Exercise of Religion, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 771, 773 (1995) 
(advocating restructuring the eagle permit process to allow tribes to distribute eagle parts); 
Roberto Iraola, The Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, 68 ALB. L. REV. 973 (2005) 
(reviewing the Eagle Act’s civil and criminal penalty provisions); Matthew Perkins, The Federal 
Indian Trust Doctrine and the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act: Could Application of the 
Doctrine Alter the Outcome in U.S. v. Hugs?, 30 ENVTL. L. 701, 703, 711, 727 (2000) 
(concluding that Indian trust doctrine provides the most viable means for tribal members to 
challenge the Eagle Act); Kyle Persaud, A Permit to Practice Religion for Some but not for 
Others: How the Federal Government Violates Religious Freedom When it Grants Eagle 
Feathers Only to Indian Tribe Members, 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 115, 115–16 (2010) (arguing that 
denying individuals who are not tribal members, but who practice Native American religions, 
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elucidated the cross-cutting tensions in the administration of the 
Indian tribes exception.24 This Article fills that gap.25 
I propose changing the FWS’s administration of the exception 
from issuing permits to individuals to instead issuing permits to 
tribes and ultimately turning over much of the administration of the 
Indian tribes exception to the tribes themselves, acting collectively.26 
Under the first phase of my proposal, the FWS would amend its 
regulations to provide for the issuance of eagle take and possession 
permits to tribes instead of tribal members. Tribes would then 
allocate their share of eagles to their members. When a sufficient 
number of tribes have developed the necessary governance structures 
(with technical and financial support from the FWS), the tribes 
acting collectively could be empowered to define the contours of the 
Indian tribes exception, including perhaps defining who is entitled to 
take and possess eagles and for what purposes; how they may be 
obtained, transferred and disposed; and how the initial allocation of 
permits should be changed. Not much can be done to alleviate the 
baseline problem of an inadequate supply of a religiously significant 
species; the Eagle Act will always reflect the clash between religious 
freedom and species protection.27 The added inequality of the Indian 
tribes exception and the burdens of the current regulatory system, 
however, can be alleviated simply by changing the Act’s 
administration. 
 
access to eagle parts violates RFRA); Kevin J. Worthen, Eagle Feathers and Equality: Lessons 
on Religious Exceptions from the Native American Experience, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 989, 993 
(2005) (concluding that the preferential treatment of tribal members in the Eagle Act satisfies “the 
requirements of both liberty and equality to an acceptable degree”). 
 24. Suggestions that Congress should amend the Eagle Act are impractical. See Dalton, 
supra note 22, at 1578, 1617; De Meo, supra note 23, at 810–12. James Dalton also suggested 
that tribes should be given greater authority under the Eagle Act, Dalton, supra note 22, at 1618–
21, but his comment did not provide a sufficient analytical foundation for his ideas or explore 
their implications. 
 25. Legal scholars who write about Native American religion have focused more on sacred 
sites than sacred animals. See, e.g., Kristen A. Carpenter, The Interests of “Peoples” in the 
Cooperative Management of Sacred Sites, 42 TULSA L. REV. 37 (2006); Richard B. Collins, 
Sacred Sites and Religious Freedom on Government Land, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 241 (2003); 
Howard J. Vogel, The Clash of Stories at Chimney Rock: A Narrative Approach to Cultural 
Conflict over Native American Sacred Sites on Public Land, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 757 
(2001). 
 26. See infra Part IV. 
 27. See infra Parts III.A, IV. 
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Although the problem of religious claims to eagles poses unique 
challenges, scholarly work in other contexts supports my proposal.28 
Kristen Carpenter, Sonia Katyal, and Angela Riley developed a 
theory of indigenous cultural property premised on the idea that 
certain resources are integral to indigenous group identity and 
therefore deserving of legal protection.29 Applying that framework 
here entails recognizing that, because eagles are central to tribal 
identity, that resource is a form of cultural property, and therefore 
tribes should be empowered to participate in defining the contours of 
the stewardship regime for eagles. Scholarship proposing community 
property solutions to overexploitation of commons resources 
suggests the same result.30 My proposal also goes part of the way 
toward giving tribes the sort of meaningful self-determination that 
Indian-law academics have urged in recent years.31 
Although the differential treatment of tribal members and non-
members with the same religious needs is both necessary and 
justifiable,32 exempting tribes instead of tribal members would ease 
the inequitable tension in the current administration of the Eagle Act. 
As the plain language of the Indian tribes exception reveals, 
Congress intended the exception to operate as an accommodation for 
Indian tribes with whom the federal government has long interacted 
as sovereigns. Implementing the exception consistent with its plain 
language by issuing permits to tribes would transform what currently 
looks like an individual religious exemption into the political 
accommodation it was meant to be. The Eagle Act would no longer 
favor certain individual religious practitioners over other individual 
 
 28. See infra Part IV.A. 
 29. Kristen A. Carpenter, Sonia K. Katyal, and Angela R. Riley, In Defense of Property, 118 
YALE L.J. 1022, 1028 (2009); see also Kristen A. Carpenter, Real Property and Peoplehood, 27 
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 313, 322–23 (2008). 
 30. See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF 
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 1–2 (James E. Alt & Douglass C. North eds., 1990); 
Sheila R. Foster, Collective Action and the Urban Commons, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 57, 62 
(2011); Kristin N. Johnson, Things Falling Apart: Regulating the Credit Default Swap Commons, 
82 U. COLO. L. REV. 167, 168 (2011); Amy Sinden, The Tragedy of the Commons and the Myth 
of a Private Property Solution, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 533, 546–47 (2007). 
 31. See, e.g., Hope M. Babcock, A Civic-Republican Vision of “Domestic Dependent 
Nations” in the Twenty-First Century: Tribal Sovereignty Re-envisioned, Reinvigorated, and Re-
empowered, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 443, 446 (2005); Rebecca Tsosie, Reconceptualizing Tribal 
Rights: Can Self-Determination Be Actualized Within the U.S. Constitutional Structure?, 15 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 923, 925 (2011); Kevin K. Washburn, Tribal Self-Determination at the 
Crossroads, 38 CONN. L. REV. 777 (2006). 
 32. See infra Part III.B. 
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religious practitioners. Rather, it would respect the sovereignty of 
tribes that enjoy a government-to-government relationship with the 
United States.33 
This suggested change in the administration of the Eagle Act 
also would alleviate some of the burden the permit process currently 
imposes on Indian religious practitioners, by empowering tribes to 
devise administrative procedures for allocating eagles that are more 
consonant with tribal members’ religious needs and sensitivities. 
Any discomfort with the government evaluating the bona fides of 
applicants’ religious beliefs or interpreting the tenets of applicants’ 
religions would be alleviated by turning those tasks over to tribal 
governments.34 
This change in practice might have salutary effects for the FWS 
as well. Presumably, administering the permit system would be 
easier if the number of potential applicants were only 566, not over 
two million. In the process of preparing tribes to administer their 
eagle permits, those tribes that do not currently have game 
regulations or enforcement capacity could be encouraged to develop 
them, and some of the enforcement burden could eventually shift to 
the tribes.35 
The logistics of implementing this proposal will be challenging 
and require input from many stakeholders, particularly the tribes who 
own the cultural property interest in eagles. At the first stage of my 
proposal, the stakeholders would have to figure out, among other 
things, how to allocate this limited resource initially; what to do with 
individuals who are currently on the waiting list; and how to avoid 
disadvantaging tribes that are less administratively organized. The 
second stage of my proposal might be even more challenging in that 
it would require the tribes acting collectively to reach a consensus on 
what the contours of the Indian tribes exception should be.36 
Why should the government take on this enormous task? 
Because the current system is not sustainable long-term as it is 
currently structured, for the government, for tribes, or for eagles. 
Because, although the United States has no legal obligation to 
accommodate tribal religion, it has a moral obligation. And because 
 
 33. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 34. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 35. See infra Part IV.B.3. 
 36. See infra Part IV.C. 
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the eagle problem is uniquely amenable to solution at the 
administrative level. The United States should act voluntarily and 
immediately to protect tribal interests in this resource that is so 
central to tribal identity. Otherwise, the bald eagle may recover, but 
tribal religions will become endangered. 
This Article proceeds as follows. I describe the current 
framework of the Eagle Act, including statutes, regulations, and case 
law, in Part II. In Part III, I address the tensions in the current 
administration of the Eagle Act, including scarcity and inequality, 
which provide the stimulus for questioning the status quo. Finally, 
Part IV examines my proposal for alleviating those tensions. 
II.  THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
A.  The Eagle Act 
After two false starts in the 1930s,37 President Roosevelt signed 
the Act for the Protection of the Bald Eagle on June 8, 1940.38 The 
preamble to the Act recited that the Continental Congress in 1782 
had adopted the bald eagle as the national symbol, “the bald eagle is 
no longer a mere bird of biological interest but a symbol of the 
American ideals of freedom,”39 and it “is now threatened with 
extinction.”40 The statute made it unlawful to “take, possess, sell, 
purchase, barter, offer to sell, purchase or barter, transport, export or 
import, at any time or in any manner, any bald eagle, commonly 
known as the American eagle, alive or dead, or any part, nest, or egg 
 
 37. The Senate passed eagle protection bills in 1930 and 1935, both of which died in the 
House. See 72 CONG. REC. 6612 (1930); 79 CONG. REC. 10061 (1935). The Eagle Act gained 
sufficient support to pass in the House only after the federal courts’ view of the Commerce 
Clause power over wildlife began to change. See, e.g., Cerritos Gun Club v. Hall, 96 F.2d 620 
(9th Cir. 1938) (upholding a provision of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act that exceeded the terms 
of the migratory bird treaties as a valid exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce 
Clause); Cochrane v. United States, 92 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1937) (same). 
 38. Pub. L. No. 76-567, 54 Stat. 250 (1940). At the time, the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 40 
Stat. 755 (1918) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–11 (2006)), did not protect raptors. 
See Convention Between the United States and Great Britain for the Protection of Migratory 
Birds, 39 Stat. 1702 (1916) (not including raptors among list of protected birds); Convention 
Between the United States and Mexico for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Game 
Mammals, 50 Stat. 1311 (1936) (same). 
 39. Not surprisingly, given the backdrop of fascist belligerence in Europe, patriotism 
permeated the hearings on the bill. See Protection of Bald Eagle: Hearing on H.R. 4832 Before 
the H. Comm. on Agric., 76th Cong. 49, 75, 76–77, 79, 80 (1940) (statements of Rep. Charles 
Russell Clason, Maud Phillips, President, Blue Cross Animal Relief, and Dr. T.S. Palmer, 
President, District of Columbia Audubon Society). 
 40. Pub. L. No. 76-567, 54 Stat. 250 (preamble). 
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thereof,” except as permitted by the Secretary of the Interior.41 The 
term “take” broadly included “pursue, shoot, shoot at, wound, kill, 
capture, trap, collect, or otherwise willfully molest or disturb.”42 
Section 2 of the Act authorized the Secretary of the Interior, if he 
determined it to be “compatible with the preservation of the bald 
eagle as a species to permit the taking, possession, and transportation 
of [bald eagles] for the scientific or exhibition purposes of public 
museums, scientific societies, or zoological parks, or . . . for the 
protection of wildlife or of agricultural or other interests in any 
particular locality.”43 
Because young golden eagles are very difficult to distinguish 
from young bald eagles,44 and bald eagle populations continued to 
suffer,45 Congress extended the statute’s prohibitions to golden 
eagles in the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act of 1962.46 At the 
suggestion of the Department of the Interior, however,47 Congress 
recognized that “feathers of the golden eagle are important in 
religious ceremonies of some tribes,”48 and carved out an exception 
authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to permit the taking, 
possession, and transportation of eagles and eagle parts for “the 
religious purposes of Indian tribes.”49 
 
 41. Id. §§ 1, 2 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 668a). 
 42. Id. § 4 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 668c). 
 43. Id. § 2 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 668a). 
 44. 107 CONG. REC. 10507–8 (1961) (statement of Sen. Yarborough) (explaining that 
immature bald eagles “are so similar to the golden eagle that only trained ornithologists are said 
to be able to distinguish the two species; therefore many bald eagles are taken by mistake”). 
 45. Id. at 10508. 
 46. Pub. L. No. 87-884, 76 Stat. 1246 (1962). 
 47. Miscellaneous Fish and Wildlife Legislation: Hearings before the Subcomm. on 
Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation of the H. Committee on Merch. Marine and Fisheries, 87th 
Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1962) [hereinafter House Hearings 1962] (pointing out that the golden eagle 
was “important in enabling many Indian tribes, particularly those in the Southwest, to continue 
ancient customs and ceremonies that are of deep religious or emotional significance to them”). 
 48. H.R. REP. NO. 87-1450, at 2 (1962) (recognizing the importance of golden eagle feathers 
“in religious ceremonies of some Indian tribes”); see also S. REP. NO. 87-1986, at 3–4 (1962) 
(noting that golden eagle feathers “are an important part of Indian religious rituals”); 108 CONG. 
REC. 22270 (1962) (remarks of Sen. Keating) (stating that the golden eagle “is of religious 
significance to many Indian tribes in America today”). The House report also noted that Indian 
religious use of eagles resulted in the killing of “a large number of the birds” and that “if steps are 
not taken . . . there is grave danger that the golden eagle will completely disappear.” H.R. REP. 
NO. 87-1450, at 2. 
 49. 16 U.S.C. § 668a. See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 740–43 (1986) (describing 
legislative history of 1962 amendment). 
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Under regulations implementing the Indian tribes exception, 
only enrolled members of federally recognized Indian tribes with 
which the United States maintains a government-to-government 
relationship may apply for permits.50 When the Department of the 
Interior first issued regulations implementing the Indian tribes 
exception in 1963, it provided that “[a]pplications for permits to take 
and possess bald eagles or golden eagles for the religious purposes of 
Indian tribes must be submitted by individual Indians.”51 The 1974 
amendments to the regulations required applicants to “attach a 
certification from the Bureau of Indian Affairs that the applicant is 
an Indian.”52 In 1999, Interior clarified that permits under the Indian 
tribes exception are available only to members of federally 
recognized Indian tribes.53 Instead of submitting a certification from 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the revised regulations require 
applicants to attach a certification signed by an official of “an Indian 
tribe that is federally recognized under the Federally Recognized 
Tribal List Act of 1994, 25 U.S.C. 479a-1, 108 Stat. 4791 (1994).”54 
The 1963 regulations provided that the Secretary could issue 
permits only to “authentic, bona fide practitioners of [tribal] 
religion.”55 The applicant was required to name the religious 
ceremony in which the eagles would be used and “enclose a 
statement from a duly authorized official of the religious group in 
question verifying that the applicant [was] authorized to participate 
in such ceremonies.”56 Interior deleted the latter requirement in 1999, 
explaining that religious official certification was “largely 
duplicative of the separate requirements of tribal membership 
certification and the individual’s statement on the application form 
itself, under penalty of perjury, of the individual’s religious need for 
the permit.”57 The regulations still require applicants to identify the 
tribal religious ceremony for which the eagles are needed,58 but the 
application form states: “You may choose not to provide the name of 
 
 50. 50 C.F.R. § 22.22(a) (2012) (referencing 25 U.S.C. § 479a-1). 
 51. 28 Fed. Reg. 976 (Feb. 1, 1963) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 11.6(d) (1967)). 
 52. 39 Fed. Reg. 1158, 1184 (Jan. 4, 1974) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 22.22(a)(5) (1975)). 
 53. 64 Fed. Reg. 50,467, 50,473 (Sept. 17, 1999). 
 54. Id. (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 22.22(a)(5) (2012)). 
 55. 28 Fed. Reg. 976 (Feb. 1, 1963) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 11.5 (1967)). 
 56. Id. (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 11.6(d) (1967)). 
 57. 64 Fed. Reg. 50,468, 50,473. 
 58. 50 C.F.R. § 22.22(a)(4) (2012). 
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the religious ceremony if doing so will violate your religious 
beliefs.”59 
Under the so-called Morton Policy, tribal members do not need 
permits to possess dead eagles and eagle parts that they already own. 
In a 1975 policy statement clarifying the Eagle Act’s enforcement, 
Secretary of the Interior Rogers C. B. Morton announced that 
“American Indians” could, “without fear of Federal prosecution, 
harassment, or other interference . . . possess, carry, use, wear, give, 
loan, or exchange among other Indians, without compensation, all 
federally protected birds, as well as their parts or feathers.”60 The 
Attorney General, echoing the Morton Policy, recently clarified that 
the federal government will not prosecute members of federally 
recognized Indian tribes for possessing eagles or eagle parts or for 
giving them to or exchanging them with other tribal members 
without compensation.61 Therefore, applications for possession 
permits are actually requests to obtain eagles or eagle parts from the 
FWS. Applications for permits to possess eagle parts are processed at 
the Service’s regional migratory-bird permit offices and, if approved, 
are forwarded to the National Eagle Repository in Commerce City, 
Colorado,62 the only legal source for new eagles and eagle parts63 
 
 59. Form 3-200-15A (rev. 2010), available at http://www.fws.gov/forms/3-200-15a.pdf. The 
application for take permits simply asks for the name of the applicant’s religion. Form 3-200-77 
(rev. 2010), available at http://www.fws.gov/forms/3-200-77.pdf. 
 60. News Release, Department of the Interior, Morton Issues Policy Statement on Indian 
Use of Bird Feathers (Feb. 5, 1975), available at 
http://www.fws.gov/news/historic/1975/19750205 
.pdf. The Morton Policy also permitted “American Indians” to “transfer such feathers or parts to 
tribal craftsmen without charge, but such craftsmen may be compensated for their work.” Id. The 
Policy further clarified that Interior would continue to enforce statutory prohibitions against 
“killing, buying or selling of eagles, migratory birds, or endangered species.” Id. The Eighth 
Circuit upheld the Morton Policy against a claim that it discriminates on the basis of race in 
United States v. Eagleboy, 200 F.3d 1137 (8th Cir. 1999), where the court reversed the dismissal 
of a charge against a Native American who was not a member of a federally recognized Indian 
tribe for possessing hawk parts in violation of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act. 
 61. Memorandum from the Attorney General to the Assistant Attorney General, Env. and 
Natural Res. Div., All U.S. Attorneys, Director, Exec. Office for U.S. Attorneys 3 (Oct. 12, 
2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/ef-policy.pdf. The Attorney General also reiterated 
the Morton Policy’s commitment not to prosecute tribal members for giving eagle feathers to 
craftspersons “to be fashioned into objects for eventual use in tribal religious or cultural 
activities,” so long as no compensation is paid for the bird parts themselves. Id. And the Attorney 
General clarified that tribal members would not be prosecuted for “[a]cquiring from the wild, 
without compensation of any kind, naturally molted or fallen feathers,” id., though tribal 
members must obtain a permit to salvage eagle carcasses or parts other than feathers. Id. at 7 n.9. 
 62. See Office of Law Enforcement, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, http://www.fws.gov/le 
/national-eagle-repository.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2013). 
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aside from tribally operated aviaries.64 The Repository receives dead 
eagles and eagle parts and distributes them free of charge to qualified 
permit applicants on a first-come, first-served basis.65 Because the 
demand for eagle parts exceeds the supply, applicants must wait long 
periods for their requests to be filled.66 
Applicants for permits to take eagles must identify the species 
and number of eagles or feathers proposed to be taken and the state 
and local area where the taking is proposed.67 In processing 
applications, the FWS considers “the direct or indirect effect which 
issuing such a permit would be likely to have upon the wild 
populations of bald or golden eagles.”68 When processing permits to 
take eagles, the Service also considers whether the National Eagle 
Repository can satisfy the applicant’s need.69 
On April 29, 1994, “as part of an historic meeting with all 
federally recognized tribal governments,” President Clinton signed 
an executive memorandum that sought to facilitate the collection and 
distribution of bald and golden eagles and their parts “[b]ecause of 
the feathers’ significance to the Native American heritage and 
consistent with due respect for the government-to-government 
relationship between the Federal and Native American tribal 
governments.”70 Accordingly, the President ordered the Department 
of the Interior to “ensure the priority distribution of eagles, upon 
permit application, first for traditional Native American religious 
 
 63. De Meo, supra note 23, at 788; Jay Wexler, Eagle Party, 14 GREEN BAG 2D 181, 182 
(2011). The Eagle Act does not prohibit possession of bald eagles that were lawfully taken prior 
to the enactment of the Bald Eagle Protection Act in 1940, or golden eagles that were lawfully 
taken prior to the 1962 amendments. 16 U.S.C. § 668(a) (2006). 
 64. The FWS issues permits allowing tribes to operate aviaries. See Form 3-200-78 (rev. 
2010), available at http://www.fws.gov/forms/3-200-78.pdf. As of June 2012, four tribes 
operated eagle aviaries—the Zuni, Iowa, Comanche, and Navajo—and the Citizen Potawatomi 
Nation was expected to open an aviary soon. Email from Eliza Savage, Regulatory Analyst, U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service, to author (June 19, 2012, 10:45 a.m. EST) (on file with author). The 
FWS is currently considering adopting a regulation that would add the bald and golden eagle to 
the list of raptors that may be propagated in captivity. Migratory Bird Permits; Changes in the 
Regulations Governing Raptor Propagation, 76 Fed. Reg. 39,367 (July 6, 2011). 
 65. See United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 944 (10th Cir. 2008); U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE 
SERVICE, supra note 62; How Can I Obtain Eagle Feathers or Parts?, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE 
SERVICE, http://www.fws.gov/faq/featherfaq.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2013). 
 66. See infra Part II.A. 
 67. 50 C.F.R. § 22.22(a) (2012). 
 68. 50 C.F.R. § 22.22(c) (2012). 
 69. See Friday, 525 F.3d at 945. 
 70. Memorandum of Apr. 29, 1994: Policy Concerning Distribution of Eagle Feathers for 
Native American Religious Purposes, 59 Fed. Reg. 22, 953 (May 4, 1994). 
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purposes, to the extent permitted by law, and then to other uses.”71 
The President also ordered the Interior Department to simplify the 
permit process, minimize the delay in distributing eagles, and work 
more closely with tribal governments.72 Consistent with that 
directive, in Director’s Order No. 69, issued on March 30, 1994, the 
Director of the FWS stated that “[b]ecause the demand always 
exceeds the supply, eagles will not be donated or distributed for any 
other purpose until the needs of Native Americans have been met.”73 
B.  The Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. 
Smith,74 the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment allows the 
application of neutral, generally applicable laws to religious 
exercises even when the laws are not supported by a compelling 
governmental interest.75 Smith held that the Free Exercise Clause did 
not require Oregon to exempt from its criminal drug laws the 
sacramental ingestion of peyote by members of the Native American 
Church.76 Following Smith, Free Exercise Clause claims challenging 
the Eagle Act for its burden on the exercise of religion would likely 
fail. 
Litigants may raise similar claims, however, under RFRA. 
Congress enacted RFRA following Smith to codify, as a requirement 
of federal statutory law, the Free Exercise Clause standard that the 
Supreme Court applied before Smith in Sherbert v. Verner77 and 
Wisconsin v. Yoder.78 RFRA allows the government to “substantially 
burden a person’s exercise of religion” only if “it demonstrates that 
application of the burden to the person . . . (1) is in furtherance of a 
compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive 
means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”79 Under 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, DIRECTOR’S 
ORDER NO. 69 § 4.a (1994), available at http://www.fws.gov/policy/DO69.html. 
 74. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 75. Id. at 884–89. 
 76. Id. at 877–82. 
 77. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 78. 406 U.S. 205 (1972); accord 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2006); see also Gonzales v. O 
Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 (2006) (explaining that RFRA 
codified “a statutory rule comparable to the constitutional rule rejected in Smith”). 
 79. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)–(b) (2006). 
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RFRA, the person contesting the government action must first prove 
that the action substantially burdens a sincerely held religious 
belief.80 When the plaintiff has met that threshold, the government 
bears the burden on the compelling-interest and narrow-tailoring 
elements of RFRA.81 The government, however, is not required to 
“refute every conceivable option” to prove that a law is narrowly 
tailored.82 Once the government provides evidence that an exemption 
would impede the government’s compelling interests, the plaintiff 
“must demonstrate what, if any, less restrictive means remain 
unexplored.”83 RFRA provides a “workable test for striking sensible 
balances between religious liberty and competing prior governmental 
interests.”84 The test must “be applied in an appropriately balanced 
way, with particular sensitivity” to important governmental 
interests,85 and “with regard to the relevant circumstances in each 
case.”86 
C.  The Case Law 
Individuals who are members of federally recognized Indian 
tribes (tribal members) and individuals who are not members of 
federally recognized Indian tribes (nonmembers) have raised RFRA 
as a defense to eagle-related criminal charges and as the basis for 
affirmative claims against the federal government. The cases fall into 
three categories, and the courts have upheld the application of the 
Eagle Act in all three. 
The circuits are uniform in upholding the Eagle Act against 
challenges by tribal members charged with taking eagles without a 
permit.87 In United States v. Friday,88 for example, Winslow Friday, 
 
 80. Thiry v. Carlson, 78 F.3d 1491, 1494–95 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 81. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1(b), 2000bb-2(3) (2006); O Centro, 546 U.S. at 428. 
 82. Hamilton v. Schriro, 74 F.3d 1545, 1556 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 83. Id.; see also Fowler v. Crawford, 534 F.3d 931, 940 (8th Cir. 2008) (explaining that the 
burden of proof shifted back to plaintiff after the government provided evidence that the 
exemption would impede a compelling government interest). 
 84. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5) (2006). 
 85. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 722 (2005) (addressing the identical standard under 
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act). 
 86. S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 9 (1993). 
 87. See United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 944 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. Oliver, 
255 F.3d 588 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Hugs, 109 F.3d 1375 (9th Cir. 1997). Cf. United 
States v. Fryberg, 622 F.2d 1010 (9th Cir. 1980) (affirming conviction of tribal member who 
claimed treaty right to kill bald eagles); United States v. Top Sky, 547 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1976) 
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a member of the Northern Arapaho Tribe, shot an eagle for use in the 
Sun Dance.89 Friday had not applied for a take permit from the 
FWS.90 The government charged him with a misdemeanor violation 
of the Eagle Act, and the district court granted Friday’s motion to 
dismiss under RFRA.91 The Tenth Circuit reversed.92 Then-Judge 
Michael McConnell, writing for the court, held that requiring Friday 
to apply for a take permit before shooting an eagle did not 
substantially burden his religion and that the permitting process is 
narrowly tailored to achieve the government’s compelling interests.93 
The circuits are also in accord in cases in which nonmembers, 
appearing as criminal defendants or civil plaintiffs, allege that the 
Eagle Act’s possession ban violates RFRA.94 In United States v. 
Hardman,95 the Tenth Circuit consolidated for purposes of rehearing 
en banc three cases involving eagle possession by nonmembers.96 In 
the case involving Joseluis Saenz, the court recognized that the Eagle 
Act serves compelling interests,97 but concluded that the United 
States had failed to prove that the regulatory scheme furthers those 
interests and affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of Mr. 
Saenz.98 Because the United States had not had an opportunity to 
develop a record in the trial courts in the other two cases, against 
Raymond Hardman and Samuel Ray Wilgus, the court remanded 
those cases for consideration of the least restrictive means element of 
 
(per curiam) (affirming conviction of tribal member who claimed Free Exercise Clause and treaty 
right to sell eagle parts). 
 88. 525 F.3d 938 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 89. Id. at 945. Mr. Friday promised his grandmother on her deathbed that he would 
participate in the Sun Dance. Eagle Case Belongs in Tribal Court, INDIANZ.COM (Oct. 7, 2009), 
http://www.indianz.com/News/2009/016885.asp; Feds Need to Get Their Act Together on Eagle 
Feathers, THE BUFFALO POST (Oct. 7, 2009, 9:08 AM), http://buffalopost.net/?p=3453. 
 90. Friday, 525 F.3d at 945. 
 91. Id. at 946. 
 92. Id. at 960. 
 93. Id. at 948. 
 94. See United States v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274 (10th Cir. 2011); United States v. Vasquez-
Ramos, 531 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Antoine, 318 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(sale and possession charges); Gibson v. Babbitt, 223 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) 
(denial of possession permit application); see also Rupert v. Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service, 957 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding denial of application to possess eagle feathers filed 
by nonmember Native American did not violate Free Exercise Clause). 
 95. 297 F.3d 1118 (10th Cir. 2002) (en banc). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 1128–29. 
 98. Id. at 1132, 1136. 
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the RFRA test.99 On remand, the district court dismissed the charges 
against both Hardman and Wilgus.100 The United States did not 
appeal in the Hardman case.101 But in United States v. Wilgus,102 the 
Tenth Circuit reversed and joined the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits in 
holding that the Eagle Act satisfies RFRA.103 
The federal government has also successfully rebutted RFRA 
claims in criminal cases concerning the commercial trade in 
eagles.104 In United States v. Antoine,105 for example, the defendant 
claimed that prosecuting him for bartering eagle parts violated RFRA 
because, for him, the exchange of eagle parts had religious 
significance.106 The courts of appeals have not addressed head-on the 
question of whether buying and selling eagles can be a bona fide 
religious practice, but reject the RFRA claims for other reasons.107 
Aside from the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Hardman, only two 
courts have held against the government in Eagle Act cases involving 
religion claims.108 Both cases concerned tribal members who killed 
eagles without a permit. The district court in United States v. 
Gonzales109 held that requiring an applicant for a permit to take an 
eagle to identify the ceremony in which the eagle will be used, and 
include a certification from a tribal elder that the applicant is 
authorized to participate in that ceremony, violated RFRA.110 The 
FWS no longer requires permit applicants to submit that 
information.111 The court’s primary holding in United States v. 
Abeyta112 was that the Eagle Act did not abrogate the defendant’s 
 
 99. Id. at 1131. 
 100. United States v. Wilgus, 606 F. Supp. 2d 1308 (D. Utah 2009). 
 101. United States v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274, 1281 n.4 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 102. 638 F.3d 1274 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 103. Id. at 1295. 
 104. United States v. Antoine, 318 F.3d 919, 920 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Hugs, 109 
F.3d 1375, 1378 (9th Cir. 1997); cf. United States v. Top Sky, 547 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1976) (per 
curiam) (holding Fort Bridger Treaty did not convey right to sell eagles). 
 105. 318 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 106. Id. at 920. 
 107. But see Top Sky, 547 F.2d at 487–88 (holding that district court’s finding that 
commercial trade in eagles does not have religious significance was not clearly erroneous). 
 108. See United States v. Gonzales, 957 F. Supp. 1225 (D.N.M. 1997); United States v. 
Abeyta, 632 F. Supp. 1301 (D.N.M. 1986). 
 109. 957 F. Supp. 1225 (D.N.M. 1997). 
 110. Id. 
 111. See supra text accompanying notes 56-59. 
 112. 632 F. Supp. 1301 (D.N.M. 1986). 
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hunting rights under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.113 That 
conclusion is no longer valid after the Supreme Court’s holding in 
United States v. Dion114 that the Eagle Act did abrogate Indian treaty 
hunting rights.115 
III.  THE TENSIONS 
Despite the uniformity of outcomes in Eagle Act cases, there are 
several reasons to consider changing the regulatory structure. Natural 
resources statutes typically balance resource use and resource 
preservation. Because the primary use for eagles is religious, the 
Eagle Act must balance religious exercise against species 
preservation. Unfortunately, the religious demand for eagles far 
exceeds the supply.116 Tribal members wait for years to receive 
eagles from the Repository, leading some turn to the black market to 
fill their needs.117 Adding to the tension between species preservation 
and religious exercise is the inequality of the Indian tribes exception. 
Tribal members can obtain eagles for their religious purposes, but 
individuals who are not tribal members cannot, even if their religious 
need is indistinguishable.118 Moreover, tension persists within the 
case law itself. The courts of appeals are split on the government’s 
evidentiary burden in these cases, and they are all over the map on 
which compelling interests the Indian tribes exception furthers.119 
Finally, the tribal community is dissatisfied with the current 
regulatory scheme.120 Those tensions are frustrating the purposes of 
the Eagle Act and provide an impetus to reexamine the status quo. 
A.  Scarcity 
The primary problem of natural-resource management is 
scarcity.121 When the supply of a resource is unlimited, the resource 
requires no management regime because there is plenty to go around. 
When the supply is limited, however, and insufficient to meet the 
 
 113. Id. 
 114. 476 U.S. 734 (1986). 
 115. Id. at 745. 
 116. See infra Part III.A. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See infra Part III.B. 
 119. See infra Part III.C. 
 120. See infra Part III.D. 
 121. See Martin Nie, Governing the Tongass: National Forest Conflict and Political Decision 
Making, 36 ENVTL. L. 385, 389 (2006). 
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demand, natural resources law steps in to regulate the use of the 
resource.122 Thus, natural resources statutes typically pit resource use 
against resource preservation.123 The National Park Service Organic 
Act is a classic example of this: it requires the Park Service “to 
provide for the enjoyment” of the national parks, while 
simultaneously conserving them and leaving them “unimpaired for 
the enjoyment of future generations.”124 
Cases raising religious claims under the Eagle Act are typical of 
natural resources cases in that the primary problem is scarcity. There 
simply are not enough eagles to satisfy the demand for dead eagles 
while still preserving the viability of the species.125 If there were an 
unlimited supply of eagles, there would be little need to give them 
statutory protection. Some natural resources statutes are atypical, 
however, in that one of the uses they must manage is religious use.126 
The Eagle Act is the most noteworthy of those statutes, because it 
expressly acknowledges and accommodates religious use of the 
protected resource.127 The primary tension in cases raising religious 
claims under the Eagle Act, then, is between eagle protection and 
religious exercise. 
 
 122. See JAMES RASBAND, JAMES SALZMAN & MARK SQUILLACE, NATURAL RESOURCES 
LAW AND POLICY 36 (2d ed. 2009); see also Sinden, supra note 30, at 534 (“The central question 
of environmental policy is ‘how much?’”). 
 123. See generally Jan G. Laitos & Rachael B. Reiss, Recreation Wars for Our Natural 
Resources, 34 ENVTL. L. 1091 (2004) (discussing the current era of natural resources regulation, 
in which the law must reconcile the interests of preservationists with the interests of 
recreationalists). 
 124. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2006); see Jay D. Wexler, Parks as Gyms? Recreational Paradigms and 
Public Health in the National Parks, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 155, 160 (2004) (“As many have 
observed, this ‘dual mandate’ sets up a difficult tension for the Service, which must balance 
conservation with recreation to ensure that the parks can be enjoyed by current and future 
generations without the sacrifice of natural resources.”). 
 125. See DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, supra note 73 
(stating that in implementing the Eagle Act and the Endangered Species Act, FWS needs to 
recognize that the demand for dead eagle parts “always exceeds the supply”); Wexler, supra note 
63, at 185 (asserting that demand for eagle parts has increased disproportionately because of the 
public’s awareness regarding the Repository). 
 126. See Access Fund v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 499 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2007) (upholding 
Forest Service ban on rock climbing at site that has religious significance for an Indian tribe); 
United States v. Adeyemo, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (regarding religious freedom 
defense to charges of violating the Endangered Species Act by importing and possessing leopard 
skins). 
 127. 16 U.S.C. § 668a (2006). 
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Kristen Carpenter cautioned that “American Indian religious 
practices are sensitive subjects.”128 The U.S. government long sought 
“to eliminate ‘heathenish practices’” from tribal life and criminalized 
many religious rituals.129 That history of religious persecution, 
Carpenter pointed out, shapes any discussion of tribal religion.130 
Moreover, there is great variety in Native American religion.131 
Indeed, the Western concept of “religion” itself may not fit the 
practices of many Native Americans for whom “religion is 
inseparable from relationships and rituals, from stories and place.”132 
With those cautions in mind, I will attempt to explain briefly the 
importance of eagles in Native American religion. 
Not all Native Americans require eagles for their religious 
practices, and among those who do, the uses vary.133 One unifying 
thread among those who require eagles is that the eagle is 
“considered a sacred messenger to the spirit world.”134 For the Hopi, 
for example, the golden eagle “serves as the link between the 
spiritual world and the physical world . . . a connection that 
 
 128. Kristen A. Carpenter, Considering Individual Religious Freedoms Under Tribal 
Constitutional Law, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 561, 562 (2004) [hereinafter Carpenter, Religious 
Freedoms]; see also Kristen A. Carpenter, Limiting Principles and Empowering Practices in 
American Indian Religious Freedoms, 45 CONN. L. REV. 387, 396 (2012) [hereinafter Carpenter, 
Limiting Principles] (describing how the law’s lack of context for unique Native American 
religious practices has posed difficulties for Native American religious practitioners bringing free 
exercise claims). 
 129. FELIX COHEN, COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 1.04 (2009); see also 
William Bradford, Beyond Reparations: An American Indian Theory of Justice, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1, 30–31 (2005) (outlining the Indian claim for redress based on federal suppression of Indian 
religion); Allison M. Dussias, Ghost Dance and Holy Ghost: The Echoes of Nineteenth-Century 
Christianization Policy in Twentieth-Century Native American Free Exercise Cases, 49 STAN. L. 
REV. 773, 787–805 (1997) (detailing federal suppression of Native American religion from 1882 
to 1934). 
 130. Carpenter, Religious Freedoms, supra note 128, at 563. 
 131. Worthen, supra note 23, at 989–90 n.2. See Carpenter, Religious Freedoms, supra note 
128, at 563; Carpenter, Limiting Principles, supra note 128, at 403. 
 132. Carpenter, Religious Freedoms, supra note 128, at 562; see also DAVID GETCHES ET AL., 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 727 (6th ed. 2011) (“The very dichotomy 
suggested by the separate treatment of ‘religion’ and ‘culture’ reflects the inadequacies of the 
dominant society’s categories in trying to accommodate Indian spiritual beliefs and value 
systems. For most tribal Indians, culture is coterminous with religion, both terms encompassing 
the spiritual dimension of a human being living in harmony with all persons and nature.”); 
Carpenter, Limiting Principles, supra note 128, at 397 (“In many American Indian communities, 
the traditional Indian religion is at the root of the tribal culture, social structure, subsistence 
practices, and even, in theocratic tribes, government.”). 
 133. Worthen, supra note 23, at 990 n.2. 
 134. De Meo, supra note 23, at 774; see also id. at 775 (“Eagles are, in essence, Native 
American prayer messengers.”). 
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embodies the very essence of Hopi spirituality and belief.”135 The 
Hopi gather golden eaglets soon after birth, raise the fledglings, then 
send the eagles “to their spiritual home” and use the eagles’ feathers 
for various religious ceremonies. This annual process sustains “the 
connection between the spiritual and physical worlds for the next 
generation of Hopi.”136 Other Native American religions prohibit the 
killing of eagles and only allow practitioners to collect molted 
feathers or to pluck feathers from eagles without inhibiting their 
ability to fly.137 
Eagle feathers and parts are used in religious ceremonies 
throughout the year and throughout one’s lifetime, including naming, 
coming-of-age, marriage, burial, healing, and seasonal 
ceremonies.138 For example, in the Northern Arapaho Tribe, the 
annual Sun Dance, which was among those the federal government 
outlawed in the late nineteenth century,139 requires the dance sponsor 
to construct an offering lodge and acquire an eagle for use in the 
dance as “a gift of the creator.”140 The eagle must be pure, meaning it 
cannot have died from poisoning, disease, electrocution, or 
automobile impact, and it cannot have been used in a prior Sun 
Dance.141 
The religious demand for eagles and eagle parts far exceeds the 
Repository’s supply and the species’ viability.142 When the Eagle Act 
was enacted in 1940, trophy hunting, poisoning by ranchers to 
prevent livestock depredation, and habitat loss had reduced bald 
 
 135. Worthen, supra note 23, at 990 (quoting Religious Ceremonial Collection of Golden 
Eaglets from Waputki National Monument, 66 Fed. Reg. 6516, 6517 (proposed Jan. 22, 2001)). 
 136. Id. at 990 n.3 (quoting Religious Ceremonial Collection of Golden Eaglets from Waputki 
National Monument, 66 Fed. Reg. 6516, 6517 (proposed Jan. 22, 2001)). 
 137. De Meo, supra note 23, at 775–76. 
 138. Id. at 776; Keith Coffman, Eagle Center Struggles to Supply American Indians Rituals, 
CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Apr. 25, 2012, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-04-25/features/sns-rt-
us-usa-religion-eaglesbre83o19v-20120425_1_national-eagle-repository-bald-eagles-eagle-
carcasses (quoting Hopi anthropologist Micah Loma’omvaya: “Eagles are integral to everything 
we do. Not just for ceremonies, but offerings with eagle feathers are made for fertility, rain, 
hunting—everything good in life.”). 
 139. See COHEN, supra note 129. 
 140. United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 942 (10th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 141. Id. at 943. 
 142. The severe disjunction between supply and demand for eagles necessitates some sort of 
permitting system to allocate the eagle resource, as does the Eagle Act itself. 16 U.S.C. § 668a 
(2006). 
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eagle populations.143 Starting in the late 1940s, the use of DDT for 
pest control, among other things, caused bald eagle populations to 
plummet to the point where the Secretary of the Interior, in 1967, 
listed the bald eagle in the lower forty-eight states as endangered.144 
By 2007, bald eagle populations had rebounded sufficiently for the 
FWS to remove the bald eagle from the list of species protected 
under the Endangered Species Act.145 At that time, the FWS 
estimated that there were 9,789 nesting pairs of bald eagles in the 
lower forty eight states.146 “Bald eagles are now repopulating areas 
throughout much of the species’ historical range that were 
unoccupied only a few years ago.”147 They continue to face pressure, 
however, from habitat modification, illegal taking, disease, 
contaminants, electrocution on power lines, collisions with vehicles, 
and in the future, collisions with wind energy facilities.148 Moreover, 
the greater religious demand is for golden eagles.149 Although there 
is no reliable data on golden eagle populations nationwide, the 
species has been extirpated from much of its historic range, and 
populations in the western United States are declining.150 
Moreover, the increase in bald eagle populations has not 
translated into equivalent increases in the supply of bald eagles at the 
National Eagle Repository.151 Most of the eagles turned in to the 
 
 143. 77 Fed. Reg. 25,792, 25,794 (May 1, 2012). 
 144. Id. at 25,795; 32 Fed. Reg. 4001 (Mar. 11, 1967). Bald eagles were initially listed as 
endangered under the Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1966, formerly codified at 16 
U.S.C. §§ 668aa–668cc (2006). In 1978, the Secretary of the Interior listed bald eagles as 
endangered in all of the lower forty-eight states except five, in which it was listed as threatened. 
77 Fed. Reg. at 25,795. The bald eagle’s status was changed to threatened in all of the lower 
forty-eight states in 1995. 60 Fed. Reg. 36,000 (July 12, 1995). 
 145. 72 Fed. Reg. 37,346 (July 9, 2007). The delisting of the bald eagle was predicated in part 
on the continued protection of the species under the Eagle Act. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533(a)(1)(D), 
(c)(2) (2006) (requiring Secretary to consider “inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms” 
when determining whether to list or delist a species as threatened or endangered); 72 Fed. Reg. 
37,353, 37,362–66, 37,367 (July 9, 2007); see also United States v. Vasquez-Ramos, 531 F.3d 
987, 991 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that when the Department of the Interior removed the bald eagle 
from the endangered species list it emphasized that the eagle would continue to be protected 
under the Eagle Act) 
 146. 72 Fed. Reg. 37,346, 37,347 (July 9, 2007). 
 147. 77 Fed. Reg. 25,792, 25,795 (May 1, 2012). 
 148. 72 Fed. Reg. at 37,358–70. 
 149. United States v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274, 1282 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 150. 74 Fed. Reg. 46,836, 46,839 (Sept. 11, 2009); U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., FINAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT: PROPOSAL TO PERMIT TAKE AS PROVIDED UNDER THE BALD 
AND GOLDEN EAGLE PROTECTION ACT 52–54 (2009), available at http://www.fws.gov 
/migratorybirds/CurrentBirdIssues/BaldEagle/FEA_EagleTakePermit_Final.pdf. 
 151. Wilgus, 638 F.3d at 1291. 
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Repository are killed in places where they are likely to be noticed by 
a person, that is, on roads or under power lines.152 The FWS, 
however, has reduced eagle mortality from vehicle collisions and 
power-line electrocution.153 The Service has tried to maximize the 
Repository’s supply by conducting outreach to the Service’s field 
staff, state fish and game departments, tribes, and the general public 
to ensure that those who find eagle carcasses know where to send 
them.154 But “those very efforts to raise awareness have also led to 
an increase in applications for eagle parts from eligible” tribal 
members who were not previously aware of the Repository.155 
The result is that tribal members have to wait long periods for 
eagles and eagle feathers from the Repository:156 more than two and 
one-half years for a whole bald eagle and three and one-half to four 
years for a golden eagle.157 And the backlog at the Repository has 
grown. In 1985, there were 527 applications pending at the 
Repository.158 Now there are over six thousand,159 which is a 
significant number, particularly when compared to the approximately 
ten thousand nesting pairs of eagles in the lower forty-eight states.160 
The scarcity problem promises to get worse, as the number of tribal 
members is growing,161 and spirituality among tribal members may 
 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id.; see also United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 958–59 (10th Cir. 2008) (discussing 
government measures to reduce eagle deaths due to electrocution). 
 154. Wilgus, 638 F.3d at 1291. 
 155. Id.; see also Wexler, supra note 63, at 185 (“Demand has increased significantly in 
recent years as the word has gotten out that the Repository is the place to go for legal eagles.”). 
 156. See Wilgus, 638 F.3d at 1291; Friday, 525 F.3d at 944. 
 157. Wilgus, 638 F.3d at 1291; Dan Frosch, A Repository for Eagles Finds Itself in Demand, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/05/us/a-repository-for-eagles-finds-
itself-in-demand.html. 
 158. United States v. Abeyta, 632 F. Supp. 1301, 1303 (D.N.M. 1986). 
 159. Wexler, supra note 63, at 185; Coffman, supra note 138; Frosch, supra note 157; see 
also Possession of Eagle Feathers and Parts by Native Americans, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. 
(Feb. 2009), http://www.fws.gov/le/pdf/PossessionOfEagleFeathersFactSheet.pdf (indicating that 
there is a very high demand for eagle parts); National Eagle Repository, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE 
SERV., http://www.fws.gov/le/Natives/EagleRepository.htm (stating that as of 1995 there were 
3,000 more approved applications than there were available eagles); How Can I Obtain Eagle 
Feathers or Parts?, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., http://www.fws.gov/faq/featherfaq.html 
(“Currently, there are over 4,000 people on the waiting list for approximately 900 eagles the 
Repository receives each year. Applicants can expect to wait approximately 2 and one half years 
for an order to be filled.”). 
 160. See 72 Fed. Reg. 37,346, 37,347 (July 9, 2007). 
 161. See BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, AMERICAN INDIAN POPULATION AND LABOR FORCE 
REPORT, at iii (2005), available at http://www.bia.gov/cs/groups/public/documents/text/idc-
001719.pdf. 
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be on the rise too.162 No available data reveal what proportion of 
tribal members require eagles for their religious practices, but it is 
probably safe to assume that more tribal members will translate into 
more applications to the Repository. 
Religious demand for eagles among nonmembers is also 
significant and growing. Although there are only about two million 
members of federally recognized tribes, on the 2010 census 2.9 
million people reported their race as solely American Indian or 
Alaska Native—an increase of 18 percent since 2000—and another 
2.3 million people reported having some Native ancestry—an 
increase of 39 percent since 2000.163 Thus, more than three million 
people who are not tribal members report having some Native 
American ancestry. Again, no available data reveal what proportion 
of those people practice Native American religions that require 
eagles, but it is safe to assume that a “non-trivial” proportion of them 
would request eagles from the Repository if they were eligible.164 
And, of course, an unknown number of people have no Native 
American ancestry, but practice Native American religions and need 
eagles for religious purposes.165 Additionally, one million people in 
the United States practice Afro-Caribbean religions, like Santeria, 
that require eagles for religious rituals, and their number is 
increasing as well.166 In sum, as Professor Raymond Bucko testified 
at the Wilgus trial, “[w]hile hard numbers are elusive at best, what is 
evident is that the numbers of persons, both Native and non-Native, 
engaging in some type of Native American or ‘primal’ religious 
practice is on the rise,” and the number of people whose religious 
 
 162. Frosch, supra note 157 (“More and more of our young people are going back to our 
spiritual way of life, and we can’t do our ceremonies without the eagles.” (quoting Oglala Sioux 
member Lee Plenty Wolf)); Appellant’s Appendix at 96, United States v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274 
(10th Cir. 2011) (No. 09-4046) (declaration of Associate Professor Raymond A. Bucko) 
(“[P]eople who declare Native American religious participation is on the rise.”). 
 163. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE POPULATION: 
2010, at 1, 4 (2012), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-10.pdf. 
 164. United States v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274, 1292 (10th Cir. 2011) (“[A] non-trivial number 
of additional applicants would appear, if the rules were changed.”). 
 165. Id. at 1281–82, 1291. 
 166. Wilgus, 638 F.3d at 1291; Appellant’s Appendix, supra note 162, at 467 (testimony of 
Raphael Martinez). The government’s expert on Santeria in the Wilgus case explained that 
Santerians worship their guardian spirit or “orisha” and that each orisha has favorite foods, colors, 
plants, flowers, and animals—including eagles. Id. at 147 (affidavit of Raphael Martinez). “Bird 
offerings are common in all Santeria rituals.” Id. 
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practices “could possibly entail the use of [eagle] feathers” is 
“trending upwards.”167 
The imbalance between supply and demand for eagles feeds the 
“thriving” black market.168 The FWS discovered crimes involving 
24,984 eagles or eagle parts between 1997 and 2007, even though 
fewer than two hundred officers nationwide engage in wildlife law 
enforcement,169 and black market prices and activity are increasing 
exponentially.170 Tribal members frustrated with the Repository 
system are driven to the black market to fill their needs.171 The high 
price paid for eagles on the black market may also lead tribal 
members who receive eagles from the Repository to sell them on the 
black market and seek more feathers from the Repository.172 In fact, 
the majority of people charged with illegally taking or selling eagles 
are tribal members.173 
FWS law enforcement officers testified at the Wilgus trial that 
pow-wow dance competitions, in which both tribal members and 
nonmembers compete, also drive the black market by offering 
sizeable cash prizes.174 Competitors are judged not only on their 
dancing ability, but also on their regalia, which include feather fans 
and bustles.175 “[T]he more decorated with eagle feathers a 
 
 167. Appellant’s Appendix, supra note 162, at 97, 98 (declaration of Professor Raymond A. 
Bucko). 
 168. Wilgus, 638 F.3d at 1291; United States v. Vasquez-Ramos, 531 F.3d 987, 989 (9th Cir. 
2008) (citing S. Rep. No. 71-180, at 2 (1930)); see also Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coal. v. 
Kempthorne, 477 F.3d 1250, 1273 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Other reports state that the trade in wildlife 
products comprises the world’s second largest black market, trailing only trade in illegal 
narcotics.”). 
 169. Appellant’s Appendix, supra note 162, at 190 (summary of LEMIS Eagle Case Violation 
and Property Data Since 1/1/1997 to 10/03/2007); id. at 508, 533 (testimony of FWS Information 
Technology Specialist Mike McLeod and FWS Agent Edward Dominguez). 
 170. Id. at 89, 345 (declaration and testimony of FWS Special Agent Kevin Ellis); id. at 539, 
541, 551 (testimony of FWS Agent Edward Dominguez). 
 171. See Wilgus, 638 F.3d at 1283 (citing Appellant’s Appendix, supra note 162, at 86–87) 
(noting testimony from FWS agents describing black market demand from pow-wow dance 
competitions). 
 172. Id. at 1294. 
 173. Appellant’s Appendix, supra note 162, at 555 (testimony of FWS Agent Edward 
Dominguez). 
 174. Id. at 347–49, 364, 533–35 (testimony of FWS Special Agents Kevin Ellis and Edward 
Dominguez). As explained above, the government does not prosecute tribal members for 
possessing eagle feathers. See text accompanying notes 60–61. Hence, tribal members may use 
eagle feathers from the Repository in pow-wow competitions. 
 175. Appellant’s Appendix, supra note 162, at 86–87 (declaration of FWS Special Agent 
Kevin Ellis). 
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competitor’s costume, the more likely he is to win.”176 Some 
costumes include feathers from as many as ten to twelve eagles.177 
Dancers “are often looking for new and better feathers,” and people 
who kill eagles “approach winners of pow-wows and attempt to sell 
them feathers as they know cash for purchases is readily 
available.”178 Hence, the demand for eagle feathers on the pow-wow 
circuit is considerable,179 and attendance at pow-wows “seems to 
have risen significantly over the last decade, thus increasing the 
demand for migratory bird feathers.”180 Non-Native American 
collectors drive up prices as well.181 
The black market affects eagles directly because feathers 
commonly enter the black market through illegal killing.182 FWS 
Special Agent Edward Dominguez explained at the Wilgus trial that 
the black market is supplied “by eagles being poisoned intentionally, 
by people climbing up trees to steal young eaglets from nests and 
nourishing them until they have molted to where their feathers are in 
perfect condition, and people shooting livestock and game to lure 
eagles to feed on them and then shooting the eagles.”183 As the 
Supreme Court held in Andrus v. Allard,184 “It was reasonable for 
Congress to conclude that the possibility of commercial gain presents 
a special threat to the preservation of the eagles because that prospect 
creates a powerful incentive both to evade statutory prohibitions 
against taking birds and to take a large volume of birds.”185 In sum, 
the imbalance between the supply and demand for eagles leaves the 
species vulnerable and tribal religious needs unsatisfied. 
 
 176. Wilgus, 638 F.3d at 1283. 
 177. Appellant’s Appendix, supra note 162, at 534 (testimony of FWS Agent Edward 
Dominguez). 
 178. Id. at 87 (declaration of FWS Special Agent Kevin Ellis); id. at 364 (testimony of FWS 
Special Agent Kevin Ellis). 
 179. See id. at 533–34 (testimony of FWS Agent Edward Dominguez). 
 180. Id. at 87 (declaration of FWS Special Agent Kevin Ellis). 
 181. See Wilgus, 638 F.3d at 1283. 
 182. Appellant’s Appendix, supra note 162, at 88 (declaration of FWS Special Agent Kevin 
Ellis). 
 183. Id. at 539 (testimony of FWS Agent Edward Dominguez). 
 184. 444 U.S. 51, 58 (1979). 
 185. Id. at 58. 
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B.  Inequality 
One of the things that makes cases raising religious claims under 
the Eagle Act particularly difficult is the Indian tribes exception.186 
Allowing members of federally recognized tribes to take and possess 
eagles while others with the same religious needs are prohibited from 
doing so adds a layer of inequality in these cases. I believe that this 
inequality is not only justifiable, but necessary.187 Nonetheless, the 
differential treatment of individuals with the same religious needs 
adds a tension to Eagle Act cases that should inspire us to question 
the current regulatory scheme. 
This sort of inequitable treatment of religious practitioners was 
at the center of Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do 
Vegetal.188 An Amazonian religious group filed suit under RFRA to 
enjoin the government from enforcing the Controlled Substances Act 
to block the group’s importation and use of a hallucinogenic tea for 
religious purposes.189 The Supreme Court rejected the government’s 
argument that the Controlled Substances Act “simply admits of no 
exceptions,”190 characterizing it as a “slippery slope” argument that 
“[i]f I make an exception for you, I [would] have to make one for 
everybody, so no exceptions.”191 Rather, the Court held that “RFRA 
operates by mandating consideration . . . of exceptions to ‘rule[s] of 
general applicability.’”192 Thus, under RFRA, courts must look 
“beyond broadly formulated interests justifying” federal statutes and 
“scrutinize[] the asserted harm of granting specific exemptions to 
particular religious claimants.”193 
 
 186. See 16 U.S.C. § 668a (2006). 
 187. Professor Worthen and James Dalton have already answered the concern that the Indian 
tribes exception violates the Establishment Clause. See Worthen, supra note 23, at 1002–16 
(concluding that that the Eagle Act is “compatible with the basic demands of equality” because 
Native Americans are differently situated from non-Native Americans with respect to religion); 
Dalton, supra note 22, at 1605–16; Wilgus, 638 F.3d at 1287; Rupert v. Director, U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service, 957 F.2d 32, 35 (1st Cir. 1992). Both Hardman and Wilgus abandoned their 
Establishment Clause claims in United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 1119 (10th Cir. 2002) 
(en banc). 
 188. 546 U.S. 418 (2006). 
 189. Id. at 423. 
 190. Id. at 430. 
 191. Id. at 421, 436. 
 192. Id. at 436 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) (2006)). 
 193. Id. at 431; see also id. at 439 (RFRA “requires the Government to address the particular 
practice at issue”). 
 
Fall 2013] EAGLES & INDIAN TRIBES 81 
The primary problem for the government in O Centro was that 
the Controlled Substances Act authorizes the Attorney General to 
waive the Act’s requirements in certain circumstances,194 and 
regulations have long exempted the use of peyote for Native 
American religious use.195 The government attempted to justify that 
special treatment based on the United States’ “unique relationship” 
with federally recognized Indian tribes,196 but the Court held that the 
government failed to demonstrate how that unique legal status makes 
tribal members “immune from the health risks the Government 
asserts accompany any use of a Schedule I substance.”197 
O Centro does not control the outcome in Eagle Act cases. In O 
Centro, there was no indication that the supply of the hallucinogenic 
tea was limited or that other religious groups were vying for the same 
tea. In Eagle Act cases, in contrast, different groups compete for 
access to the same limited resource, and the statute itself allows only 
members of federally recognized Indian tribes to use that resource.198 
Broadening the Indian tribes exception would not just alleviate the 
religious burden on particular litigants. Instead, it would shift that 
burden to other religious practitioners, namely, tribal members.199 O 
Centro did not concern that sort of burden-shifting claim.200 
Moreover, in Eagle Act cases, the government attempts to 
comply with the Supreme Court’s instructions in O Centro: it 
“weigh[s] the impact” of altering the regulatory scheme and tries to 
demonstrate that “granting the requested religious accommodations 
would seriously compromise its ability to administer” the Eagle 
Act.201 The government has shown to the courts’ satisfaction what 
the result would be if access to the resource were expanded.202 
That said, the government is currently considering expanding 
the use of eagles as a resource. When the bald eagle was listed as a 
threatened species under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 
 
 194. Id. at 432–33 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 822(d)). 
 195. Id. at 433. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 434. 
 198. 16 U.S.C. § 668a (2006); 50 C.F.R. § 22.22 (2012). 
 199. See United States v. Antoine, 318 F.3d 919, 923 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 200. See United States v. Vasquez-Ramos, 531 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Nothing in O 
Centro Espírita undercuts the ruling in Antoine that this redistribution of burdens does not raise a 
valid RFRA claim.”). 
 201. O Centro, 546 U.S. at 430, 435. 
 202. See United States v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274, 1292–94 (10th Cir. 2011). 
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sections 7 and 10 of that Act provided mechanisms for authorizing 
bald eagle takes that were “associated with, but not the purpose of, a 
human activity.”203 The FWS gave its assurance to holders of ESA 
eagle take authorizations that it would not enforce the Eagle Act or 
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act against them.204 The Service removed 
the bald eagle from the list of threatened species in 2007205 and 
issued regulations in 2009 to replace the now-inapplicable ESA take 
authorizations.206 The 2009 regulations authorize the taking of bald 
and golden eagles where the take is compatible with the preservation 
of the species and is “associated with but not the purpose of [an] 
activity.”207 In issuing these so-called “nonpurposeful take” 
permits,208 the regulations require the Service to give higher priority 
to “Native American religious use for rites and ceremonies that 
require eagles be taken from the wild.”209 In other words, the Service 
cannot issue a nonpurposeful take permit if the eagle population then 
would be unable to accommodate additional takes of live eagles for 
the religious purposes of Indian tribes.210 
The FWS has not yet issued a nonpurposeful take permit for a 
wind power facility, but it anticipates the demand for such permits 
will reach an average of forty per year by the year 2020.211 Granting 
those permits would shift the Eagle Act case law to more closely 
resemble O Centro. If the Secretary determines that, after tribal 
religious needs are met, eagle populations remain sufficiently robust 
to allow eagles to be taken for power-generation purposes, O Centro 
 
 203. Eagle Permits; Take Necessary to Protect Interest in Particular Localities, 74 Fed. Reg. 
46,836, 46,837 (Sept. 11, 2009). 
 204. Id. at 46,836. 
 205. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 72 Fed. Reg. 37,346 (July 9, 2007) 
(codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). 
 206. Eagle Permits; Take Necessary to Protect Interest in Particular Localities, 74 Fed. Reg. 
46,836 (Sept. 11, 2009) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 13, 22). 
 207. 50 C.F.R. § 22.26(a) (2012). 
 208. Eagle Permits; Changes in the Regulations Governing Eagle Permitting, 77 Fed. Reg. 
22,267 (proposed Apr. 13, 2012) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 13, 22). 
 209. 50 C.F.R. § 22.26(e)(4) (2012). 
 210. Id. § 22.26(f)(6). The regulations also specify that the Service retains the authority to 
amend a permit “if new information indicates that revised permit conditions are necessary” or to 
suspend or revoke a permit where doing so is “necessary to safeguard local or regional eagle 
populations,” id. § 22.26(c)(7), but that provision does not appear to enable the Service to revoke 
a permit if tribal religious needs increase. 
 211. Eagles Permits; Changes in the Regulations Governing Eagle Permitting, 77 Fed. Reg. at 
22,272. New Era Wind recently filed the first application under these regulations. See Minn. Wind 
Farm Seeks First Eagle-Kill Permit, EENEWS.NET (Jan. 18, 2013), http://www.eenews.net 
/Greenwire/2013/01/18/4. 
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would appear to mandate that the government give at least as much 
consideration to the religious needs of nonmembers as it gives to 
power companies. Whether O Centro dictates the outcome in RFRA 
challenges to the Eagle Act or not, however, the tension highlighted 
in that case remains and provides impetus to question the current 
regulatory scheme. 
C.  Tension Within the Case Law 
In addition to the tension between eagle protection and the free 
exercise of religion, which is compounded in Eagle Act cases by the 
inequality of the Indian tribes exception, tension within the case law 
itself provides further impetus to revisit the current regulatory 
scheme. First, the courts of appeals disagree about the government’s 
evidentiary burden in cases raising RFRA challenges to the Eagle 
Act. In Hardman, the Tenth Circuit, sitting en banc, remanded, 
requiring the government to present “hard evidence” showing how 
the current regulatory scheme “serve[s] each of its asserted 
interests.”212 The court requested evidence of, among other things, 
“how many eagles exist, in what direction the eagle population is 
trending, how many people can be expected to apply for permits if 
the regulations change, how much additional delay in delivering 
eagle feathers to applicants could be expected under various 
alternative schemes, and how much such delays might impact Native 
American culture.”213 To meet that burden on remand in Hardman 
and Wilgus, the prosecutors built a voluminous record214 addressing a 
host of issues, including eagle populations and trends, the supply and 
demand for eagles, the black market in eagles, the difficulties of 
enforcing the Eagle Act, and the number of people who are not tribal 
members but practice religions that require the use of eagles.215 
The Ninth Circuit in Antoine, on the other hand, did not “believe 
RFRA requires the government to make the showing the Tenth 
Circuit demands of it,” because the consequences of expanding the 
Indian tribes exception to nonmembers “are predictable.”216 Judge 
 
 212. United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 1132 (10th Cir. 2002) (en banc). 
 213. See id. at 1135. 
 214. See United States v. Wilgus, 606 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1315 (D. Utah 2009). (“After the 
case was remanded, this Court has heard testimony over several days from numerous witnesses 
and has accepted the uncontested affidavits of them and many others.”). 
 215. See United States v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274, 1281–83, 1291–92 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 216. United States v. Antoine, 318 F.3d 919, 923 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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Kozinski, writing for the court, reasoned that, because the demand 
for eagles exceeds the fixed supply, “the burden on religion is 
inescapable; the only question is whom to burden and how much.”217 
Antoine’s claim sought not to reduce the burden on religion, but to 
shift his religious burden onto others and therefore was “not a viable 
RFRA claim; an alternative can’t fairly be called ‘less restrictive’ if 
it places additional burdens on other believers.”218 
The circuits are also out of step with each other regarding which 
compelling interests the Indian tribes exception furthers. The Tenth 
Circuit in United States v. Wilgus held that the Indian tribes 
exception furthers the government’s compelling interest in “fostering 
the culture and religion of federally-recognized Indian tribes.”219 
That holding was consistent with the First Circuit’s pre-RFRA 
decision in Rupert v. Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.220 But 
the uniformity ends there. 
The inconsistency in the case law arises from the disjunction 
between the plain language of the exception and the regulations 
implementing it. The exception allows the Secretary “to permit the 
taking, possession, and transportation” of eagles “for the religious 
purposes of Indian tribes.”221 Yet, the regulations provide for issuing 
permits not to Indian tribes, but rather to individual members of 
federally recognized Indian tribes.222 Thus, in Hardman, the Tenth 
Circuit held that the government has a compelling interest in 
“fulfilling trust obligations to Native Americans,”223 but it did not 
see how “restricting personal, individual permits for religious 
purposes to members of federally recognized tribes is connected to 
the government’s sovereign-to-sovereign relationships with 
tribes.”224 In other words, the court did not see how the Indian tribes 
exception furthers the compelling interest in fulfilling the 
government’s trust obligations. The Eleventh Circuit in Gibson, in 
contrast, held that the Indian tribes exception furthers the United 
 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Wilgus, 638 F.3d at 1295. 
 220. 957 F.2d 32, 35 (1st Cir. 1992). 
 221. 16 U.S.C. § 668a (2006) (emphasis added). 
 222. 50 C.F.R. § 22.22 (2012) (“We will issue a permit only to members of Indian entities 
recognized and eligible to receive services from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs listed 
under 25 U.S.C. 479a-1.”). 
 223. United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 1129 (10th Cir. 2002) (en banc). 
 224. Id. at 1134. 
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States’ interest in fulfilling treaty obligations to federally recognized 
Indian tribes.225 The Tenth Circuit in Hardman did not find that 
interest compelling,226 but even if it had, it may not have believed 
that granting permits to individual tribal members fulfills treaty 
obligations that are generally owed to Indian tribes.227 
The Ninth Circuit has not identified which compelling interests 
the Indian tribes exception serves, because it held that any claim 
seeking to shift a litigant’s religious burden onto others is not viable 
under RFRA.228 The Eighth Circuit has had no need to identify the 
interests underlying the Indian tribes exception either, because it has 
addressed only the claim of a tribal member charged with taking an 
eagle without a permit.229 That claim required the court of appeals to 
identify only the interests underlying the permit requirement, not the 
Indian tribes exception.230 Thus, the question of which compelling 
interests the Indian tribes exception furthers is another point of 
tension in the case law. 
Finally, while panels of the Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh 
Circuits have upheld the Eagle Act against RFRA challenges,231 that 
uniformity may not persist. The Act remains potentially vulnerable 
en banc in those circuits, at the panel level in other circuits, and in 
the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court’s decision in O Centro, 
although not directly controlling in Eagle Act cases, reflects a 
sympathy for religious practitioners and a skepticism about the legal 
status of federally recognized Indian tribes that could undermine the 
Eagle Act in the courts of appeals and in the Supreme Court itself. 
D.  Regulatory Burden on Tribal Members 
Another, more important reason to revisit the current regulatory 
scheme is the burden it imposes on tribal members. The Tenth 
Circuit in Friday was “skeptical that the bare requirement of 
obtaining a permit [to take eagles] can be regarded as a ‘substantial 
 
 225. Gibson v. Babbitt, 223 F.3d 1256, 1258 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam). 
 226. Hardman, 297 F.3d at 1129 n.19. 
 227. See Dry v. United States, 235 F.3d 1249, 1256 (10th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he very great 
majority of Indian treaties create tribal, not individual rights.” (quoting Hebah v. United States, 
428 F.2d 1334, 1337 (Ct. Cl. 1970)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 228. United States v. Antoine, 318 F.3d 919, 923 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 229. United States v. Oliver, 255 F.3d 588, 589 (8th Cir. 2001). 
 230. Id. (“[U]nrestricted access to bald eagles would destroy [the] legitimate and 
conscientious eagle population conservation goal of the [Eagle Act].”). 
 231. See cases cited supra notes 87, 93, 103 and accompanying text. 
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burden’ under RFRA.”232 The court pointed out correctly that many 
religious activities require government authorization, like building a 
church or operating a religious school.233 No doubt, the court was 
correct that the requirement to obtain a permit before taking an eagle 
does not rise to the level of a substantial burden under RFRA. But it 
is, nonetheless, a burden. One tribal member remarked that “[i]t’s the 
same as having to have a permit to carry a cross.”234 And tribal 
members who seek not to take eagles but to obtain parts from the 
Repository must not only fill out an application form, but also wait 
long periods of time to obtain items that are central to their religious 
practice.235 
These regulatory burdens drive some tribal members to find 
alternative, illegal sources of eagles.236 Frustration with the current 
regulatory scheme therefore increases pressure on eagle 
populations.237 Even when tribal members make the effort to jump 
through the regulatory hoops and obtain items from the Repository, 
they sometimes find the quality of the parts unsatisfactory.238 And 
tribal members object to the regulatory provision that, by accepting 
an eagle permit, the permittee consents to inspection by FWS 
agents.239 That the group intended to benefit from the Indian tribes 
 
 232. United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 947 (10th Cir. 2008). But see United States v. 
Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 1126–27 (10th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (“Any scheme that limits their 
access to eagle feathers therefore must be seen as having a substantial effect on the exercise of 
religious belief.”); United States v. Hugs, 109 F.3d 1377, 1378 (9th Cir. 1997) (“We do not 
question that the BGEPA imposed a substantial burden on the practice of such religions by 
restricting the ability of adherents to obtain and possess eagles and eagle parts.”). 
 233. Friday, 525 F.3d at 947. 
 234. Steven Bodzin, A Troubling Chapter in the Bald Eagle's Success Story, L.A. TIMES, 
July 18, 2005, http://articles.latimes.com/print/2005/jul/18/nation/na-eagles18. 
 235. See Wilgus, 638 F.3d at 1291 (indicating that even tribal members who only seek eagle 
feathers may need to wait anywhere from three to six months); Friday, 525 F.3d at 944 (stating 
that the estimated wait time for a “whole tail” from the Repository is 3.5 years). 
 236. See Hugs, 109 F.3d at 1377–78; see also De Meo, supra note 23, at 790 (“These long 
delays, coupled with the immediacy of certain religious ceremonies, force some Native 
Americans to violate this permit procedure in order to follow their religious beliefs.”). 
 237. See Wilgus, 638 F.3d at 1291–92 (quoting the testimony of FWS agents and asserting 
that “[m]any Native Americans who would normally obtain [eagle] feathers from legal 
sources . . . turn to the black market due to frustration in obtaining feather legally”); Appellant’s 
Appendix, supra note 162, at 539 (testimony of FWS Special Agents Kevin Ellis and Edward 
Dominguez) (stating that the black market is supplied by people poisoning and shooting eagles, 
or by stealing young eaglets from their nests). 
 238. Friday, 525 F.3d at 944; Coffman, supra note 138. 
 239. Friday, 525 F.3d at 951 (“If construed to allow Fish and Wildlife Service agents to 
attend the offering-lodge ceremony at the Sun Dance, Mr. Friday contends, this condition would 
violate the sacred nature of the ritual.”); 50 C.F.R. § 13.21(e)(2) (2012). 
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exception is so dissatisfied with its administration necessitates 
revisiting its implementation.240 
For all of these reasons, it is worth considering whether there is 
a way to alleviate the tensions in Eagle Act cases that also addresses 
some of the practical problems with the current regulatory approach. 
My suggestion follows. 
IV.  ALLEVIATING THE TENSIONS 
There does not appear to be any way to alleviate the baseline 
scarcity problem in Eagle Act cases sufficiently. Permits to operate 
aviaries and propagate eagles in captivity will help by generating a 
supply of molted feathers for religious use.241 But very few tribes 
have taken the opportunity to establish aviaries, and the regulations 
authorizing captive propagation of eagles have not been finalized.242 
Thus, there is no reason to think that those options will eliminate the 
severe disjunction between supply and demand. We must take the 
scarcity problem as a given.243 
Because eagles are a limited resource that faces competing 
demands—use and preservation—the Eagle Act pits two compelling 
interests against each other. The Act requires the government to 
protect the needs of recognized Indian tribes while simultaneously 
protecting eagle populations. One district court explained: 
Were the [Eagle Act] to simply ban possession for all 
persons, the government would have succeeded in 
protecting eagle parts, but failed to protect Native American 
culture. Were the [Eagle Act] to allow all persons to possess 
the eagle parts for any religious use, it would create severe 
difficulties in enforcing poaching laws, because it is (1) 
very rare to catch poachers in the act of poaching, and (2) 
nearly impossible to determine whether the birds were 
 
 240. See generally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF TRIBAL JUSTICE, DOJ 
CONSIDERATION OF EAGLE FEATHERS POLICY: TRIBAL CONSULTATION AND RESPONSE TO 
TRIBAL COMMENTS 11 (2012), available at http://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2012/06 
/consultation-on-proposed-dojeagle-feathers-policy-framing-p.pdf (summarizing tribes’ 
frustration with the current administration of the Eagle Act); Frosch, supra note 157 (“Having to 
wait so long to use eagles in religious ceremonies has become a source of frustration for many 
tribes.”). 
 241. A national aviary operated by the FWS would ease the scarcity problem as well. 
 242. See supra note 64. 
 243. United States v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274, 1291 (10th Cir. 2011) (“We must take the 
current level of supply of eagle parts . . . as a given.”). 
 
88 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:53 
poached or not, when confiscated. Not only would the 
waiting period swell, making it difficult for the recognized 
tribes to use birds for their ceremonies, but the black market 
would also increase, since more people would be able to 
possess eagle feathers—legally or illegally procured—
without fear of prosecution. In the long run, eagle 
populations would suffer. In the ensuing eagle scarcity, the 
government would have failed at both of its objectives.244 
The courts have concluded that the Indian tribes exception “sets 
those interests in equipoise.”245 As the First Circuit observed in 
Rupert, “[a]ny diminution of the exemption would adversely affect 
[the interest in protecting Native American religion and culture], but 
any extension of it would adversely affect [the interest in protecting a 
dwindling and precious eagle population].”246 
Although there is no way to balance those compelling interests 
without sacrificing one or the other, some of the tensions in the Eagle 
Act may be alleviated simply by changing the FWS’s administration 
of the Indian tribes exception. The alternative I propose is for the 
FWS to issue eagle take and possession permits to tribes instead of 
individual tribal members and ultimately turn over much of the 
administration of the Indian tribes exception to the tribes acting 
collectively. The first step to implementation is for the FWS to 
amend its regulations to provide for the issuance of permits under the 
Indian tribes exception to federally recognized Indian tribes. The 
FWS has issued the Hopi tribe’s chairman a permit to take eagles 
 
 244. United States v. Winddancer, 435 F. Supp. 2d 687, 698 (M.D. Tenn. 2006). 
 245. Rupert v. Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 957 F.2d 32, 35 (1st Cir. 1992); see 
also United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 743–44 (1986) (“Congress thus considered the special 
cultural and religious interests of Indians, balanced those needs against the conservation purposes 
of the statute, and provided a specific, narrow exception.”). 
 246. 957 F.2d at 35; see also Winddancer, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 698 (“In forming its 
categorization on a political basis, the government has balanced its two competing objectives in 
the only way this court has been shown to be possible. By limiting the number of people who can 
possess the feathers, the government succeeds in limiting the potential customers for the black 
market in eagle feathers. It also keeps the waiting period for the eagle repository low. By granting 
access to the feathers only to members of the officially recognized tribes, the government protects 
those tribes in the only way possible under the Establishment Clause.”). Cf. Wilgus, 638 F.3d at 
1295 (holding that the existing permitting scheme is the least restrictive means of furthering the 
government’s compelling interests). But cf. United States v. Antoine, 318 F.3d 919, 924 (9th Cir. 
2003) (“Any allocation of the ensuing religious burdens” between members and nonmembers of 
recognized tribes “is least restrictive because reconfiguration would necessarily restrict 
someone’s free exercise.”). 
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annually since 1986.247 Since 1997, each of these permits has 
authorized the take of up to forty golden eagles for religious 
purposes.248 The tribe itself allocates those forty eagle takes to its 
members.249 The Hopi take permit could serve as a model for other 
tribes not just for permits to take eagles, but also for permits to 
possess eagles. Because there is an insufficient supply of eagles, 
however, the stakeholders would have to determine, among other 
things, how to allocate the eagle resource initially among the 
federally recognized tribes and what to do with the people who are 
already on the Repository’s waiting list. 
Further down the road, when the process of issuing permits to 
tribes is established and the less administratively sophisticated tribes 
have developed the necessary governance structures, more of the 
permit system’s administration could be turned over to the tribes 
acting collectively. The tribes could be empowered to define the 
contours of the Indian tribes exception, including perhaps defining 
who is entitled to take and possess eagles and for what purposes; 
how they may be obtained, transferred, and disposed; and how the 
initial allocation of permits should be changed. Tribes might also 
suggest more fundamental changes to the permit system that I have 
not anticipated. 
Whether this approach is viewed as a recognition of tribes’ 
cultural property rights to the eagle resource, as a common 
ownership solution to the tragedy of the eagle commons, or as 
another example of tribal self-determination, this proposal would 
alleviate, or at least help to justify, the inequality of the current 
scheme. It would do this by bringing the administration of the Indian 
tribes exception into line with the plain language of the statute, thus 
emphasizing the exception’s inherently political nature. It would also 
 
 247. United States v. Tawahongva, 456 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1123 (D. Ariz. 2006); Boradiansky, 
supra note 22, at 711 n.14. 
 248. Tawahongva, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 1123. “Additionally, the State of Arizona has permitted 
the Hopi to take ten golden eagles per year from state lands, and the Navajo Nation has permitted 
the Hopi to take twelve eagles per year from Navajo reservation lands each year from 1998 
through 2003.” Id. 
 249. See id. (stating that the 2005 FWS permit granted to the Hopi tribe allowed “the [Hopi] 
Chairman and any tribal members designated by him to take forty golden eagles”) (internal 
quotations omitted). The bylaws of the Hopi Tribe require the Tribal Council to “negotiate with 
the United States Government agencies concerned, and with other tribes and other persons 
concerned, in order to secure protection of the right of the Hopi Tribe to hunt for eagles in its 
traditional territories.” CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS OF THE HOPI TRIBE, By-Laws art. IV 
(1937), available at http://thorpe.ou.edu/IRA/hopicons.html. 
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alleviate some of the burden that the current scheme imposes on 
tribal members, while providing regulatory benefits for the 
government. This part first explores the theoretical foundations upon 
which this proposal rests, then explains how it would alleviate some 
of the tensions in the Eagle Act, and concludes with a few brief 
thoughts on implementation. 
A.  Theoretical Foundations 
Three lines of scholarship support this approach. First, Kristen 
Carpenter and others have developed a theory of indigenous cultural 
property premised on the idea that certain resources are integral to 
indigenous group identity and therefore deserving of legal 
protection.250 Applying that framework here entails recognizing that, 
because eagles are central to tribal identity, they are a form of 
cultural property, and therefore tribes should be empowered to define 
the contours of the stewardship regime for eagles. Second, 
scholarship proposing community property solutions to 
overexploitation of commons resources suggests the same result.251 
And finally, my proposal goes part of the way toward giving tribes 
the sort of meaningful self-determination that Indian-law academics 
have urged in recent years. My goal in this section is not to give 
comprehensive accounts of the voluminous literature on these 
subjects, but merely to place my proposal within these scholarly 
frameworks. 
1.  Acknowledging Cultural Property Rights 
In an article entitled In Defense of Property, Professors Kristen 
Carpenter, Sonia Katyal, and Angela Riley responded to scholarly 
criticism of indigenous groups’ recent attempts to use property law to 
protect cultural resources.252 They argued that the critics’ conception 
of property is too narrow because “[i]n reality, indigenous cultural 
property transcends the classic legal concepts.”253 In proposing an 
alternative framework, Carpenter, Katyal, and Riley made two 
moves that are particularly salient here. First, they extended 
 
 250. Carpenter et al., supra note 29, at 1028. 
 251. Johnson, supra note 30, at 246 (proposing a community governance model “to address 
concerns in the credit default swap market”); Sinden, supra note 30, at 546–47 (“[C]ommon 
ownership regimes can . . . in some circumstances avert the tragedy of the commons.”). 
 252. Carpenter et al., supra note 29, at 1024–26. 
 253. Id. at 1027; see also id. at 1046. 
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Margaret Jane Radin’s theory of property “as an element of 
individual personhood”254 to “a model of property and peoplehood” 
premised on the idea that certain resources are integral to indigenous 
group identity and thus deserving of legal protection as “cultural 
property.”255 Second, they moved from a classic ownership paradigm 
to a stewardship paradigm, grounded on “the exercise of rights and 
obligations independent of title.”256 The stewardship model “captures 
property as a ‘web of interests,’ rather than a discrete bundle of 
rights or sticks,”257 and reveals “the unique ways in which 
indigenous groups may exercise cultural property entitlements as 
nonowners.”258 Ultimately, Carpenter, Katyal, and Riley contended 
that indigenous peoples should be legally empowered to define their 
own notions of cultural property.259 Thus, their stewardship model 
may yield a variety of practical results: some cultural property may 
be alienable, while other cultural property may be kept out of the 
market; some may be laid to rest, and some may be preserved for 
access and use.260 
Applying Carpenter, Katyal, and Riley’s cultural property 
framework here would entail first recognizing that eagles are central 
to tribal identity and thus viewing that resource as a form of cultural 
property in which tribes have an interest that should be given some 
form of legal recognition. Eagles are a critical component of many 
Native American religions, and for many tribes, religion is an 
inextricable part of tribal sovereignty.261 “[T]he primary purpose of 
tribal religion is for the survival of the tribe itself, and not for 
individual salvation.”262 Native American religions are “holistic and 
integrated in the sense that there is no separation between religion 
 
 254. Id. at 1050 (citing Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 
957 (1982)). 
 255. Id. at 1028 (emphasis added); see also Carpenter, Real Property and Peoplehood, supra 
note 29, at 322–23 (“[W]hereas Radin focuses on property that expresses individual personhood, 
I am interested in property that expresses collective ‘peoplehood.’”). 
 256. Carpenter et al., supra note 29, at 1067; see also id. at 1069 (elaborating on the concept 
of stewardship). 
 257. Id. at 1080 (quoting Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, The Reconstitution of Property: 
Property as a Web of Interests, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 281 (2002)) 
 258. Id. at 1088. 
 259. Id. at 1086. 
 260. Id. at 1085. 
 261. See Carpenter, Limiting Principles, supra note 128, at 442; Worthen, supra note 23, at 
998–99, 1014–15. 
 262. Carpenter, Limiting Principles, supra note 128, at 441–42. 
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and other aspects of life.”263 Thus, tribal members “do not 
necessarily distinguish religious practice from cultural or political 
activity.”264 
Indeed, the Indian tribes exception can be read as an 
acknowledgment of the tribal cultural property interest in eagles. 
Interior’s recommendation that Congress include an exception to the 
Eagle Act for Indian tribes’ religious needs was premised on its 
recognition that eagles are an integral part of many tribes’ identities. 
Interior pointed out to Congress that the golden eagle was “important 
in enabling many Indian tribes, particularly those in the Southwest, 
to continue ancient customs and ceremonies that are of deep religious 
or emotional significance to them.”265 
Second, Carpenter, Katyal, and Riley’s framework suggests that, 
given their cultural property interest in the eagle resource, tribes 
should be included in defining the contours of the stewardship 
regime for eagles: who is entitled to take and possess eagles and for 
what purposes, and how they may be obtained, transferred, and 
disposed.266 In other words, the administration of the Indian tribes 
exception itself would be handed over, at least in part, to the tribes. 
Carpenter, Katyal, and Riley would have no objection to partial 
empowerment of tribes since, “from [these authors’] perspective, 
assertions of cultural property rights . . . rarely . . . vest indigenous 
peoples with . . . absolute powers of control, exclusion, or 
alienation.”267 
In the Eagle Act context, two statutory constraints would 
necessarily remain. The initial, biological determination of how 
many permits can be issued “compatible with the preservation” of 
the species would have to stay with Interior.268 I would not go so far 
as to say that the cultural property interest in the eagle resource is so 
complete as to empower tribes to completely decimate the species, 
 
 263. Worthen, supra note 23, at 1004. 
 264. Dalton, supra note 22, at 1614. 
 265. Miscellaneous Fish and Wildlife Legislation: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on 
Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 
87th Cong. 3 (1962) [hereinafter House Hearings 1962]. 
 266. See Carpenter et al., supra note 29, at 1029. 
 267. Kristen A. Carpenter, Sonia K. Katyal & Angela R. Riley, Clarifying Cultural Property, 
17 INT’L J. OF CULTURAL PROP. 581, 585 (2010); see also id. at 587 (“[I]n some instances, 
indigenous peoples’ claims may need to accommodate other’s interests in science, speech, or 
invention.”). 
 268. See 16 U.S.C. § 668a (2006). 
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thus abrogating the rest of society’s interests in the preservation of 
our national symbol. The other statutory constraint that would persist 
is that only uses that can be considered “religious” would be 
permissible. Since tribes would decide for themselves what that term 
means, it might not impose much of a constraint in practice. Beyond 
those statutory constraints, however, the Indian tribes exception 
permitting process can ultimately be turned over to the tribes.269 
Applying Carpenter, Katyal, and Riley’s cultural property 
paradigm to eagles does not raise the same concerns as applying it to 
land. Unlike land, living wildlife is not seen as capable of being 
owned by individuals.270 The Supreme Court explained in Geer v. 
Connecticut271 that “the ownership of wild animals, so far as they are 
capable of ownership, is in the State, not as a proprietor, but in its 
sovereign capacity as the representative and for the benefit of its 
people in common.”272 Thus, living wildlife cannot be privately 
owned, “except in so far as the people may elect to make it so.”273 
The Supreme Court whittled away at Geer for many years until it 
finally repudiated Geer’s holding and denounced the state ownership 
doctrine as a legal fiction in Hughes v. Oklahoma.274 However, 
Hughes simply affirmed the federal government’s supreme authority 
to regulate wildlife;275 it did not hold that living wildlife can be 
privately owned.276 As Professor Babcock explained, “Hughes 
neither disturbed the common law canon of the State’s preeminent 
 
 269. The first phase of my proposal is consistent with Kristen Carpenter’s “empowering 
practices” approach by which tribes and agencies develop religious accommodations “that are 
informed by the tribal religions themselves.” Carpenter, Limiting Principles, supra note 128, at 
400. In fact, Carpenter highlights the eagle take permit the FWS recently issued to the chairman 
of the Northern Arapaho tribe, see infra note 397, as an example of this approach. Carpenter, 
Limiting Principles, supra note 128, at 465–66. The second phase of my proposal extends beyond 
the “empowering practices” approach to implement the tribal cultural property interest in eagles, 
as suggested by Carpenter’s earlier work with Professors Katyal and Riley. See Carpenter et al., 
supra note 29. 
 270. See Hope M. Babcock, Should Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council Protect Where 
the Wild Things Are? Of Beavers, Bob-O-Links, and Other Things That Go Bump in the Night, 85 
IOWA L. REV. 849, 883–89 (2000). 
 271. 161 U.S. 519 (1896), overruled by Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979). 
 272. Id. at 529 (quoting State v. Rodman, 58 Minn. 393, 400 (1894)). 
 273. Id. (quoting Ex parte Maier, 103 Cal. 476, 483 (1894)). 
 274. 441 U.S. 322, 335 (1979). 
 275. See John D. Echeverrria & Julie Lurman, “Perfectly Astounding” Public Rights: Wildlife 
Protection and the Takings Clause, 16 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 331, 366–67 (2003). 
 276. Mary Christina Wood, The Tribal Property Right to Wildlife Capital (Part I): Applying 
Principles of Sovereignty to Protect Imperiled Wildlife Populations, 37 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 62 
(2000). 
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interest in and responsibility for preserving wildlife . . . , nor did it 
disturb the idea that the State acts on behalf of its citizens when it 
takes steps to preserve wildlife.”277 Unlike land, wildlife has 
traditionally been considered a public resource.278 As a result, 
shifting from federal stewardship to tribal stewardship would not 
undermine individual property rights, but would merely replace one 
governmental steward with another.279 
2.  Collectivizing Ownership of the Commons 
In more traditional natural-resources-management terms, my 
suggestion can be conceptualized as an alternative solution to a 
tragedy of the commons. In an essay in Science magazine in 1968, 
biology professor Garrett Hardin addressed “the population 
problem.”280 Professor Hardin sketched a scenario involving a 
pasture open to all. Hardin anticipated that each herdsman, acting in 
his rational self-interest, would maximize the number of cattle he 
grazed on the pasture, leading to the pasture’s ruin.281 Thus, Hardin 
concluded that “[f]reedom in a commons brings ruin to all.”282 The 
only solutions to this tragedy of the commons, according to Professor 
Hardin, are to privatize the commons or “allocate the right to enter 
them.”283 For commons that “cannot readily be fenced,” like air and 
water, Hardin posited that “coercive laws or taxing devices” are the 
only solutions.284 Hardin acknowledged that “[e]very new enclosure 
 
 277. Babcock, supra note 270, at 886; see also id. at 889 (“[T]he Court left intact the State’s 
underlying, preeminent fiduciary duty to protect wildlife on behalf of its citizens.”); Wood, supra 
note 276, at 53 & n.258, 58–62 (“[T]he Court [in Geer] set forth a principle of sovereign 
trusteeship in wildlife that endures to this day.”). 
 278. Todd S. Aagaard, Environmental Law as a Legal Field: An Inquiry in Legal Taxonomy, 
95 CORNELL L. REV. 221, 265 (2010) (“Air, water, and wildlife are other examples of 
environmental physical public resources.”). 
 279. Applying Carpenter, Katyal and Riley’s framework to eagles, which, like all wildlife, 
have traditionally been considered a form of property, also does not raise the same concerns as 
applying their framework to other forms of cultural patrimony that have not traditionally been 
subject to property laws. See Derek Fincham, The Distinctiveness of Property and Heritage, 115 
PENN. ST. L. REV. 641, 665–66 (2011) (criticizing Carpenter, et al. for not distinguishing between 
cultural property and cultural heritage and fully accounting for the limitations of property-based 
theories). 
 280. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1243 (1968), available at 
http://www.sciencemag.org/content/162/3859/1243.full.pdf. 
 281. Id. at 1244. 
 282. Id. Hardin was not the first to identify the tragedy of the commons. See OSTROM, supra 
note 30, at 2; Sinden, supra note 30, at 546 & n.35. 
 283. Hardin, supra note 269, at 1245. 
 284. Id. 
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of the commons involves the infringement of somebody’s personal 
liberty,” but he thought that compromising personal liberty, 
particularly of the “freedom to breed,” is essential to the survival of 
humankind.285 
Nobel Prize winning political economist Elinor Ostrom 
contested Hardin’s conclusion that privatization and government 
regulation are the only possible solutions to the tragedy of the 
commons.286 She argued that “neither the state nor the market is 
uniformly successful in enabling individuals to sustain long-term, 
productive use of natural resource systems.”287 In her seminal work, 
Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective 
Action, Ostrom detailed her case studies of alternatives to state- and 
market-based solutions to commons problems and developed a 
“theory of collective action whereby a group of principals can 
organize themselves voluntarily to retain the residuals of their own 
efforts.”288 “[M]ore than any other scholar,” Ostrom “overturned the 
assumption that free riding would reign in a commons given the 
tendency toward individual self-interest. Instead, she . . . 
demonstrated that many social groups have struggled successfully 
against threats of resource degradation by developing and 
maintaining self-governing institutions.”289 
Scholars have continued to explore common property solutions 
to the tragedy of the commons in various contexts.290 Professor 
 
 285. Id. at 1248. 
 286. OSTROM, supra note 30, at 1. Others have criticized Hardin for discounting the 
possibility of community management of resources. See, e.g., Joseph W. Dellapenna, The 
Evolution of Riparianism in the United States, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 53, 67 (2011) (“[Hardin] 
largely ignored the possibility of community management (public property, if you will) as an 
alternative possibility to privatizing the ‘commons.’”); Sinden, supra note 30, at 546–47 (“Hardin 
was criticized for not recognizing that common ownership regimes can also in some 
circumstances avert the tragedy of the commons.”); see also Carol Rose, The Comedy of the 
Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Public Policy, U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 720 (1986) (exploring 
“inherently public property” as an alternative solution to market failures). 
 287. OSTROM, supra note 30, at 1. 
 288. Id. at 25; see also ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991) (demonstrating 
that people largely resolve disputes and govern themselves through informal social rules, rather 
than through a state system or central authority). 
 289. Foster, supra note 30, at 82. 
 290. E.g., Brigham Daniels, Governing the Presidential Nomination Commons, 84 TUL. L. 
REV. 899 (2010) (analyzing the trend toward earlier presidential primaries as a tragedy of the 
commons); Richard A. Epstein, The Allocation of the Commons: Parking on Public Roads, 31 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 515, 515 (2002) (examining how private rights in parking spaces are allocated 
based on rules that govern the public parking commons); Foster, supra note 30, at 62 (discussing 
collective resource management as an alternative to the tragedy of the commons); Gregg W. 
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Kristin Johnson, for example, recently advocated a “community 
governance model” to solve the commons problem in credit default 
swap markets.291 Concluding that the traditional approaches to 
solving the tragedy of the commons “spectacularly fail,”292 Johnson 
proposed a model, premised on Elinor Ostrom’s work, that “involves 
the creation of an institution managed directly by resource users with 
oversight by an external authority.”293 The external authority 
enforces standards that reflect the community’s “normative 
expectations” and prevent overexploitation of the commons. This 
structure gives “the benefits of an openly accessible resource while 
curbing self-interested behavior.”294 
The national eagle population can be viewed as a commons that 
is currently managed by “coercion by an external, central regulatory 
authority”; the FWS “exercise[s] authority to issue and revoke 
licenses that grant rights to use commons resources.”295 Absent that 
regulatory control, individual free-exercise rights to use eagles would 
compromise the resource beyond repair. That is not, however, an 
optimal solution to the tragedy of the eagle commons, if only 
because tribal members are deeply dissatisfied with the current 
regulatory structure.296 
By distributing aggregate permits to tribes, the first stage of my 
proposal draws some of the benefits of a privatization solution to the 
tragedy of the commons. When a commons is privatized, certain 
users are given the right to exploit the commons and exclude others, 
 
Kettles, Regulating Vending in the Sidewalk Commons, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 32–35 (2004) 
(concluding that sidewalk vending does not necessarily lead to a tragedy of the commons); 
Michael J. Madison, Brett M. Frischmann & Katherine J. Strandburg, Constructing Commons in 
the Cultural Environment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 657, 659 (2010) (applying Ostrom’s work to 
“environments for developing and distributing cultural and scientific knowledge through 
institutions that support pooling and sharing that knowledge in a managed way”); Pammela 
Quinn Saunders, A Sea Change Off the Coast of Maine: Common Pool Resources as Cultural 
Property, 60 EMORY L.J. 1323 (2011) (developing a model for recognizing group property rights 
in communities that are the de facto stewards of common pool resources). 
 291. Johnson, supra note 30, at 175. 
 292. Id. at 218. 
 293. Id. at 244. 
 294. Id. 
 295. Id. at 220; see also OSTROM, supra note 30, at 8–9 (examining the argument that 
problems related to the tragedy of the commons cannot be solved through cooperation, and 
governmental control with “major coercive powers” is the overwhelming solution). 
 296. See supra Part III.D. Sheila Foster observed that overconsumption of a common resource 
that is managed by the government can result from “regulatory slippage,” that is, reduced 
enforcement of regulatory standards. Foster, supra note 30, at 67. 
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which gives those users the incentive “to use the resource at 
sustainable levels.”297 “Privatization, it is thought, allocates resources 
to those who value them most, to the benefit of everyone in 
society.”298 My proposal is far from a perfect example of an effective 
privatization solution to the tragedy of the commons, if such a thing 
exists;299 I do not propose that the FWS relinquish its regulatory 
obligation to determine how many eagle permits are compatible with 
species preservation, much less convey title to individual birds. As 
Professor Sinden pointed out, solutions like mine are not truly 
“privatization,” because they do not use the market to solve the 
commons problem, but instead use government regulation “to 
address the central ‘how much’ question of environmental law.”300 
My proposal only constitutes privatization to the extent that that term 
refers to “a broad spectrum of policy choices or mechanisms that 
shift some responsibility from the government to private actors.”301 
Yet, dividing the eagle commons among recognized tribes would 
give the tribes a more direct interest in ensuring the sustainability of 
eagle populations and perhaps “introduce[] greater flexibility and 
efficiency in the management and oversight” of the eagle resource.302 
Under the current regulatory structure, tribes play no role and thus 
have no incentive to maximize resource sustainability or 
management efficiency. 
The second stage of my proposal is a variant of a common 
ownership regime insofar as it allows the tribes themselves to set 
some of the parameters for the regulatory scheme.303 Professor 
Sinden explained that “common ownership” is a “property rights 
system” wherein “group members jointly hold property rights in the 
resource as against the rest of the world.”304 Common ownership 
regimes are distinguishable from privatization regimes, however, 
 
 297. Johnson, supra note 30, at 218–19. 
 298. Id. at 219 (citing Rose, supra note 286, at 711–12). 
 299. See OSTROM, supra note 30, at 13 (noting difficulty of applying privatization solutions 
to “nonstationary resources” like fish); Sinden, supra note 30, at 605–10 (explaining difficulties 
with attempts to privatize wildlife commons). 
 300. Sinden, supra note 30, at 538. 
 301. Foster, supra note 30, at 109. 
 302. Id. at 110. 
 303. See Johnson, supra note 30, at 244. 
 304. Sinden, supra note 30, at 547. 
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because the former rely on collective decision-making, instead of the 
free market, to allocate the resource.305 
Sinden cautioned that “common property regimes don’t really 
get us very far in terms of solving the tragedy of the commons in 
most real-world situations” because they only work in “cultural 
conditions that are becoming ever less common as small 
communities become increasingly integrated into a global 
economy.”306 Insofar as my proposal is a common ownership regime, 
it may depend for its success on a community of “relatively small 
size, stable membership, and . . . homogenous culture where norms 
of reciprocity and trust predominate.”307 Although the 566 federally 
recognized Indian tribes exhibit great variety, relatively the tribal 
community in the United States is small, stable, and culturally 
homogeneous. Recognized tribes share history, beliefs, 
vulnerabilities, and needs. Thus, they share enough attributes to 
make a common ownership regime a viable alternative to the current 
regulatory system under the Eagle Act.308 Professor Foster observed 
that, with regard to urban commons, local governments play an 
important role in enabling and sustaining the collective action 
necessary for a common property regime to prosper.309 One of her 
central insights was that an inverse relationship exists between what 
she terms “endogenous variables”—i.e., the size and homogeneity of 
the resource user group and the scale of the resource—and the role of 
the government.310 Smaller, more homogeneous user groups are 
better able to cooperatively manage discrete, local common 
 
 305. Id. at 548. 
 306. Id. 
 307. Id.; see also Foster, supra note 30, at 84 (“Collective action . . . is particularly successful 
where there exists a resource with clearly defined boundaries and a community with stable 
membership and a homogeneous culture, who also share beliefs, a history, or expectation of 
continued interaction and reciprocity.”); id. at 91 (“The ability of collective commons 
management regimes to remain stable and endure over time can be very much dependent on 
community size and knittedness, community makeup, stability of community membership, 
resource scale, and shared social norms/social capital.”). 
 308. Elinor Ostrom concluded that institutional change also requires resource users to “share 
a common judgment that they will be harmed if they do not adopt an alternative rule”; “be 
affected in similar ways by the proposed rule changes”; “highly value the continuation activities 
from this [resource]”; and “face relatively low information, transformation, and enforcement 
costs.” OSTROM, supra note 30, at 211. Those factors are largely satisfied or can be satisfied in 
this context. 
 309. Foster, supra note 30, at 83, 88–91. 
 310. Id. at 92. 
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resources with limited government involvement.311 As the scale and 
complexity of the resource increases, the government plays a 
stronger role.312 Hence, in the Eagle Act context, the FWS’s 
coordinating role can be tailored to the tribal community and the 
eagle resource to minimize the transaction costs of my proposal and 
make improvements in the regulatory structure more likely to last.313 
Because the number of eagles will not change, individual tribal 
members are not likely to have any greater access to eagles under my 
proposal. Nonetheless, because their own tribal governments will 
“participate in the development of governing rules” regarding when, 
where, how, and why eagles may be taken or possessed, tribal 
members can be expected “to perceive regulation as having greater 
legitimacy.”314 That perception can only benefit eagle populations. 
3.  Furthering Self-Determination 
Issuing permits to tribes instead of individual tribal members 
also would be consistent with the scholarly response to modern 
federal Indian policy, which emphasizes tribal self-determination and 
self-governance. Beginning in the early 1960s, federal Indian policy 
began to shift toward promoting “the practical exercise of inherent 
sovereign powers possessed by Indian tribes.”315 In 1975, Congress 
aligned itself with this approach by passing the Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act,316 which required the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs to delegate the administration of health, 
education, economic development, and other social programs to 
tribal governments via contracts.317 Under so-called “638 contracts,” 
“the tribe would perform the federal government’s functions under 
 
 311. Id. 
 312. Id. at 92; see also id. at 123 (“[T]he size and scale of the resource necessarily influences 
the degree of responsibility, range of function, and discretion allowed the collective regime.”). 
 313. Id. at 92–93. 
 314. See Johnson, supra note 30, at 245. 
 315. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 1.07 (2009); see also Matthew L.M. 
Fletcher, Indian Wars: Old and New, 15 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 201, 203–13 (2012) (detailing 
the connection between President Johnson’s War on Poverty and self-determination policy); 
Washburn, supra note 31, at 779 (“Scholars generally agree that the era of tribal self-
determination began to form as early as the administration of President John F. Kennedy, and was 
formalized, at least in the Executive Branch, with Richard Nixon’s significant 1970 statement on 
federal Indian policy.”). 
 316. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 
2203 (1975) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 450). 
 317. See Washburn, supra note 31, at 779. 
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specific performance standards and record-keeping requirements 
imposed by law and federal regulations.”318 
Congress broadened self-determination policy in the Tribal Self-
Governance Act of 1994319 by “provid[ing] for an initial 
foundational agreement between a tribe and a federal agency, after 
which federal controls are diminished and the tribe assumes primacy 
over the program.”320 Instead of entering into separate contracts for 
each delegated function, the 1994 Act “allowed tribes to negotiate 
broad compacts with the Department of the Interior,” provided block 
grants covering a range of services, and gave tribes “discretion as to 
how to allocate those federal funds.”321 
That trend has continued.322 Under the Indian Tribal Energy 
Development and Self-Determination Act of 2005,323 for example, 
once a tribe enters into an agreement with the Department of the 
Interior, it can manage the development of certain tribal natural 
resources with little federal involvement.324 The National Park 
 
 318. Id. 
 319. Tribal Self-Governance Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-413, tit. IV, 108 Stat. 4270 (1994) 
(codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 450a note, 458aa). 
 320. Alex Tallchief Skibine, Indian Gaming and Cooperative Federalism, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
253, 286 (2010); see also id. at 282 (referring to the current period of federal Indian policy as the 
“Self-Governance Era”). 
 321. Washburn, supra note 31, at 780. Congress also acted to preserve tribal cultures. See, 
e.g., Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (2006) (“[I]t is the policy of this Nation to 
protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian 
tribes.”); American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (2006) (“[I]t shall be the 
policy of the United States to protect and preserve for American Indians their inherent right of 
freedom to believe, express, and exercise the traditional religions.”); Native American Languages 
Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2901 (2006) (“[T]he United States has the responsibility . . . to ensure the 
survival of these unique cultures and languages.”); Native American Graves and Repatriation Act, 
25 U.S.C. §§ 3001, 3010 (2006) (“This chapter reflects the unique relationship between the 
Federal Government and Indian tribes . . . and should not be construed to establish a precedent 
with respect to any other individual.”); Indian Tribal Justice Act, 25 U.S.C. § 3601 (2006) (“The 
Congress finds and declares that—(1) there is a government-to-government relationship between 
the United States and each Indian tribe; (2) the United States has a trust responsibility to each 
tribal government that includes the protection of the sovereignty of each tribal government; . . . 
(7) traditional tribal justice practices are essential to the maintenance of the culture and identity of 
Indian tribes and to the goals of this chapter.”). 
 322. But see Washburn, supra note 31, at 781 & n.27 (opining that the last “significant” self-
determination enactment was the American Housing and Self-Determination Act of 1996). 
 323. 25 U.S.C. § 3501 (2006). 
 324. See Skibine, supra note 320, at 286. Professor Skibine likened this statutory scheme to 
cooperative federalism under the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, and Safe Drinking Water Act. 
Id. at 287. From 1986 to 1990, Congress amended those statutes to authorize the EPA to treat 
tribes the same as states for purposes of regulating the environment in areas under their 
jurisdiction. Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e); 42 U.S.C. §§ 300j-11, 7601(d)). See generally 
Jessica Owley, Tribal Sovereignty over Water Quality, 20 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 61, 76–84 
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Service recently proposed that Congress designate the South Unit of 
Badlands National Park, which is on the Pine Ridge Indian 
Reservation, as the first “tribal national park.”325 Under this proposal, 
the Oglala Sioux Tribe would manage the South Unit pursuant to 
both tribal and federal law.326 Similarly, the FWS has proposed 
turning over the day-to-day management of the National Bison 
Range in Montana, formerly part of the Flathead Reservation, to the 
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, though FWS would retain 
oversight by a federal refuge manager.327 
Academics generally endorse these developments. Dean Kevin 
Washburn, now serving as Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs at 
the Department of the Interior, observed that “the existing tribal self-
determination initiatives are widely believed successful, and it is 
difficult to find criticism of them in any literature.”328 
Scholars focus now on expanding these self-determination 
initiatives into more meaningful self-governance and tribal 
sovereignty. Most scholars agree that genuine self-determination 
requires something more than federal policy has provided. Rather 
than try to describe the full scope of that scholarship, I highlight here 
a few recent articles that give some context to my proposal. 
Washburn, for example, argued that self-determination “must denote 
the ability of an Indian tribe to ‘determine’ its identity, or in other 
words, to create its own identity through defining and affirming its 
 
(2004) (describing tribal “treatment as state” provision in the Clean Water Act). These provisions 
are not directly analogous to my proposal because, although they reflect some respect for tribal 
sovereignty, they do not recognize any special tribal interest in a resource, much less give tribes 
authority to design the regulatory structure. 
 325. See South Unit General Management Plan, Record of Decision Signed, NATIONAL PARK 
SERVICE (June 7, 2012), available at http://www.nps.gov/badl/parknews/south-unit-general-
management-plan-record-of-decision-signed.htm; see also South Unit Badlands National Park, 
Final General Management Plan & Environmental Impact Statement, NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, 
38 (Apr. 2012), available at http://parkplanning.nps.gov/document.cfm?parkID=117&projectID 
=17543&documentID=47117 (announcing the General Management Plan and Environmental 
Impact Statement, prepared by the National Park Service in conjunction with the Oglala Sioux 
Tribe). 
 326. South Unit Badlands National Park, Final General Management Plan & Environmental 
Impact Statement, supra note 325, at 39. 
 327. Emily Yehle, FWS's Plan to Share Management of Bison Refuge with Tribes Sparks 
Lawsuit, EENEWS.NET (May 22, 2012), http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2012/05/22/9. 
 328. Washburn, supra note 31, at 781; see also id. at 781 n.28 (citing sources); id. at 779–80 
(“Although neither BIA officials nor tribes were particularly happy with the implementation of 
the 638 contracts program, the contracting of functions on Indian reservations by Indian tribes 
was widely hailed as an improvement in federal Indian policy and a meaningful step toward self-
determination.”). 
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cultural values.”329 As a practical matter, Washburn posited that 
tribal self-determination might require tribes to be able “to determine 
[their] own governmental structure and implement the policies that 
will effectuate [their] broader tribal values.”330 Federal self-
determination programs by and large have delegated federal 
programs and funds to tribes, but retained control at the federal 
level.331 “While these efforts have been enormously positive,” 
Washburn opined, they were “to some degree, low-hanging fruit that 
was easily plucked from the tree.”332 To achieve “real self-
determination,” Washburn endorsed giving tribes the authority to 
define felonies under their own criminal laws.333 
Hope Babcock drew on civic republican theory to provide a 
foundation for returning greater sovereignty to tribes.334 Not unlike 
Washburn, she wrote that giving tribes “undiminished authority to 
determine their own lives . . . is an essential aspect of 
sovereignty.”335 Federalism-inspired approaches that share 
governmental power with tribes fall short, Professor Babcock said, 
because they do not address the federal government’s self-
proclaimed power to preempt tribal law—a power that she asserted is 
inherently inconsistent with true tribal sovereignty.336 Instead, she 
 
 329. Id. at 782. 
 330. Id. 
 331. Id. at 786. 
 332. Id. 
 333. Id. Matthew Fletcher promoted agreements between tribes and state or local 
governments concerning services, economic development, and shared resources as a means of 
expanding tribal self-governance “while meeting the needs of non-Indian governments that are 
frustrated by the limited application of state law in Indian country.” Matthew L.M. Fletcher, 
Reviving Local Tribal Control in Indian Country, 53 FED. LAW. 38, 38 (2006). Similarly, Kevin 
Gover advocated negotiated agreements between tribes and the Department of the Interior “to 
apportion responsibilities for the management of Indian trust lands between the Department and 
the Tribe.” Kevin Gover, An Indian Trust for the Twenty-First Century, 46 NAT. RESOURCES J. 
317, 319 (2006). 
 334. Babcock, A Civic-Republican Vision, supra note 31, at 446. 
 335. Id. at 454. 
 336. Id. at 501, 557; see also Gover, supra note 333, at 340 (“The doctrine of federal plenary 
power, as scholar P.S. Deloria regularly points out, makes it possible for Congress and the courts 
to do away with tribal government in an afternoon, should they choose to do so.”). William 
Bradford agreed that the federal government’s plenary power over tribes must “be authoritatively 
withdrawn.” Bradford, supra note 129, at 98. He proposed a model for making reparations for the 
harm the federal government has caused Indians that would restore both ancestral lands and 
“meaningful self-determination” to tribes to the greatest extent possible. Id. at 84, 89, 91. 
Bradford’s model would give tribes “near-absolute territorial autonomy . . . in respect to all issue 
areas” except commerce, foreign relations, and defense, a change that Bradford recognized might 
require a constitutional amendment. Id. at 93, 98. 
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advocated allowing tribes to opt out of federal laws that undermine 
their sovereignty and threaten their very existence.337 
Rebecca Tsosie, in analyzing the extent to which U.S. Indian 
policy meets the aspirations of the United Nations’ Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,338 broke down the right to self-
determination into four models, all of which play some role in 
federal Indian policy. First, the “indigenous sovereignty” model 
recognizes tribes’ inherent authority as separate governments “to 
make [their] own laws and apply them within a defined territory.”339 
Professor Tsosie explained that federal Indian policy adheres to this 
model not only insofar as it protects tribes’ rights to govern their own 
territories and members, but also in that it delegates to tribes federal 
powers that may be delegated only to governmental entities, such as 
the authority to act as a state under the Clean Air Act.340 Second, 
under the “self-management” model, federal agencies authorize 
tribes to operate federally designed and funded programs. The 
contracting program under the Indian Self-Determination and 
Education Assistance Act of 1975 typifies this model.341 Third, the 
“co-management” model facilitates tribal “access and control of 
lands that are currently outside their jurisdiction,”342 such as the 
FWS proposal for the Confederated Salish and Kootenai tribes to 
manage the National Bison Range. Fourth, the “participatory 
governance” model “advocates the full participation of indigenous 
peoples within the dominant society’s political system,” a model 
reflected in the 1924 Act that gave federal citizenship to Indians.343 
Professor Tsosie concluded, along the same lines as Hope Babcock, 
that the federal government’s self-proclaimed power to “divest a 
tribal government of its sovereign powers without its consent” is 
inconsistent with international human rights law.344 Ultimately, she 
 
 337. Babcock, A Civic-Republican Vision, supra note 31, at 559, 564. 
 338. Tsosie, supra note 31, at 925. 
 339. Id. at 930. Tsosie’s argument expanded well beyond federally recognized Indian tribes. 
She argued that all indigenous peoples are entitled to self-determination under the U.N. 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Id. at 941. 
 340. Id. at 930–31 & nn.55–56. 
 341. Id. at 931; see also Judith Rae, Program Delivery Devolution: A Stepping Stone or 
Quagmire for First Nations, 7 INDIGENOUS L.J. 1, 6–9 (2008) (distinguishing self-administration 
and self-government). 
 342. Tsosie, supra note 31, at 932. 
 343. Id. at 933. 
 344. Id. at 941. Tsosie also argues that federal abrogation of Indian treaties violates the U.N. 
Declaration’s “emphasis upon the need to negotiate a contemporary political relationship between 
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applauded the Obama administration’s support of the U.N. 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, but demonstrated 
that U.S. domestic law has a long way to go to meet the normative 
aspirations of that document.345 
Empowering tribes to allocate the eagle resource is consistent 
with the trend of allowing tribal governments greater control over 
resources. The first stage of my proposal, issuing Eagle Act permits 
to tribes instead of individual tribal members, is the sort of “low-
hanging fruit”346 that could have been plucked years ago. That 
regulatory change would merely delegate part of a federal program to 
recognized tribes, while retaining control at the federal level, and 
thus extends no further than current law and policy. 
The second stage of my proposal, turning over more of the 
actual definition and administration of the Indian tribes exception to 
the tribes acting collectively, is in line with academic calls for greater 
tribal self-determination. Empowering tribes to define the contours 
of the Indian tribes exception—including, perhaps, defining who is 
entitled to take and possess eagles and for what purposes, how they 
may be obtained, transferred, and disposed, and how permits should 
be allocated—would allow tribes, in Washburn’s words, to determine 
their own identities by implementing policies that reflect tribal 
values.347 In Rebecca Tsosie’s scheme, the second stage of my 
proposal goes beyond the “self-management” model insofar as it 
does not just delegate the authority to administer a federally designed 
program, but gives tribes some, albeit limited, power to design the 
law itself.348 
The second stage of my proposal is also relatively low-hanging 
fruit insofar as it does not interfere with any settled expectations of 
non-Indians or with state authority. It certainly does not go so far as 
Professor Tsosie’s “indigenous sovereignty” model and allow tribes 
to make and apply their own law within their own territory.349 In that 
 
indigenous peoples and the nation-state that is founded upon respect, trust, and political equality.” 
Id. at 943. 
 345. Id. at 924–25. 
 346. See Washburn, supra note 31, at 786. 
 347. See id. at 782. 
 348. See Tsosie, supra note 31, at 931. 
 349. See id. at 930. My proposal also fails to satisfy Professor Tsosie’s call for enhancing the 
self-determination of indigenous groups that are not federally recognized. See id. at 941. 
Expanding access to nonmembers would be problematic for the reasons explained in the text 
accompanying notes 349–55. 
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sense, my proposal falls far short of scholarly calls for more genuine 
self-determination. For example, the Eagle Act probably falls within 
the scope of laws from which Hope Babcock believes tribes should 
be able to exempt themselves because it “touches matters at the core 
of the individual or collective identities of Aboriginal peoples as 
tribal Indians” and concerns a “fundamental collective right.”350 
Several factors preclude returning full tribal sovereignty over eagles: 
the biology of the species necessitates oversight by biological experts 
at the regional and national level; the bald eagle is not just a tribal 
resource, but our national symbol; states traditionally have regulated 
wildlife and would balk at any infringement of this authority; and 
eliminating FWS oversight would necessitate amending the Eagle 
Act. I hope that part of my proposal’s appeal is that it is a realistic 
means of returning some control over a resource that is vital to the 
identity of many tribes to the tribes themselves. 
B.  Benefits 
Shifting from permitting individual tribal members to permitting 
tribes would have several advantages. It would alleviate some of the 
inequitable tension of the current regulatory scheme, as well as some 
of the burden that scheme imposes on tribal members. It would also 
yield benefits for the federal government’s implementation of the 
Eagle Act, and it could channel the courts of appeals toward a more 
unified approach in Eagle Act cases. 
1.  Easing Inequality 
The Indian tribes exception can be seen primarily as either a 
religious accommodation or a political accommodation, and the 
interest it creates can be seen as inuring to the benefit of either 
individual tribal members or the tribes themselves. I believe the 
 
 350. See Babcock, A Civic-Republican Vision, supra note 31, at 561, 564. In the Eagle Act 
context, however, my suggestion that the FWS retain the authority to oversee the viability of the 
nation’s eagle populations is not entirely inconsistent with Babcock’s thesis. In situations where 
exempting themselves from a federal law would cause “undesired spillover impacts on adjacent 
communities,” Babcock expected that tribes would “learn to adjust [their] activities so that they 
are not harmful to residents of neighboring states.” Id. at 566. This concept seems to rely on the 
availability of federal judicial review to adjudicate competing interests. See id. at 566 n.553. 
Thus, Babcock agrees that some overriding federal standard might survive in contexts such as 
this. Moreover, the availability of federal judicial review is severely curtailed in the Eagle Act 
context because the Eagle Act does not provide a private right of action. See Defenders of 
Wildlife v. Adm’r, E.P.A., 882 F.2d 1294, 1301 (8th Cir. 1989). 
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better view takes the Indian tribes exception as primarily a political 
accommodation for Indian tribes. Essentially, I advocate treating 
tribal use of eagle feathers not as a religious issue, but as a political 
and property-based issue. Implementing the Eagle Act in accordance 
with that view and issuing permits to tribes instead of individual 
tribal members would alleviate, though not eliminate, some of the 
inequitable tension the government’s current implementation of the 
Eagle Act creates.351 
Viewing the Indian tribes exception as primarily a political 
accommodation for tribes is consistent with Congress’s intent and 
the plain language of the Eagle Act, as well as with historic practice. 
Treaties with numerous Indian tribes guaranteed them exclusive 
rights to hunt and fish on their lands.352 Those treaty rights generally 
inured to the benefit of tribes, not individuals.353 The Eagle Act 
abrogated those treaty rights with respect to eagles.354 In the 1962 
amendment to the Eagle Act, Congress restored some of those pre-
existing treaty rights through the Indian tribes exception. As the 
Supreme Court observed in Dion, Congress replaced the treaty 
regime “in which Indian on-reservation hunting was unrestricted” 
with “a regime in which the Secretary of the Interior had control over 
Indian hunting.”355 Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit held that the 
Indian tribes exception serves the United States’ interest in fulfilling 
its treaty commitments to federally recognized Indian tribes.356 
 
 351. As explained above, I believe the inequality between tribal members and nonmembers 
with the same religious needs is both necessary and justifiable. See supra text accompanying note 
187. 
 352. See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738 (1986); Menominee Tribe of Indians v. 
United States, 391 U.S. 404, 405–06 (1968); see also, e.g., Treaty with the Flatheads, 12 Stat. 975 
(1855); Treaty with the Nez Perce, 12 Stat. 957 (1855); Treaty with the Yakima, 12 Stat. 951 
(1855); Treaty with the Tribes of Middle Oregon, 12 Stat. 963 (1855); Treaty with the Chippewa, 
7 Stat. 536 (1837); Treaty of Fort Laramie with the Sioux, etc., 11 Stat. 749 (1851). 
 353. See Dry v. United States, 235 F.3d 1249, 1256 (10th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he very great 
majority of Indian treaties create tribal, not individual rights.” (internal quotes omitted)); Wood, 
supra note 276, at 33, 35–36 (discussing treaty fishing rights). 
 354. Dion, 476 U.S. at 745. 
 355. Dion, 476 U.S. at 743; see also Gibson v. Babbitt, 72 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1360 (S.D. Fla. 
1999) (“[B]y providing bald and golden eagle parts to federally recognized Indian tribes, the 
United States—albeit in a substituted fashion—is fulfilling a pre-existing treaty obligation to the 
tribes.”). 
 356. Gibson, 223 F.3d at 1258 (per curiam). Scholars have justifiably criticized the 
administrative process through which the Department of the Interior determines which groups are 
entitled to federal acknowledgment. See, e.g., Tsosie, supra note 31, at 939–40. 
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That Congress intended the Indian tribes exception to be an 
accommodation for tribes is reflected in its decision to exempt 
“Indian tribes,” not “Indians.”357 “It is an elementary rule of 
construction that effect must be given, if possible, to every word, 
clause and sentence of a statute.”358 If Congress had intended to 
accommodate the religious needs of individual Indians, it could have 
drafted an exception to accomplish that purpose.359 Congress should 
not be presumed to have intended a different result.360 Thus, the plain 
language of the Indian tribes exception indicates that it was intended 
to be primarily an accommodation for tribes. 
Moreover, that intent is consistent with the federal government’s 
traditional practice of interacting with Indian tribes as sovereigns 
rather than with individual members of tribes. Although some federal 
statutes provide benefits to individual tribal members, “the United 
States always treated Indian affairs as a relationship between the 
federal government and Indian tribes, not as a race-based relationship 
involving Indians.”361 Thus, the Indian tribes exception is best seen 
as primarily a political—not religious—accommodation for tribes 
and not for individuals. 
 
 357. See Carpenter, Limiting Principles, supra note 128, at 437 (“Congress explicitly 
referenced the rights of tribes as an aspect of its interest in accommodating Indian religious 
freedoms.”). 
 358. 2A Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 46:6 (7th ed. 2011) (quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. 
Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538–39 (1955) (“It is our duty ‘to give effect, if possible, to every 
clause and word of a statute.’”). 
 359. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 479 (1934) (defining “Indian” in Indian Reorganization Act to 
include “all other persons of one-half or more Indian blood”). 
 360. See, e.g., Ransom v. FIA Card Services, N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716, 724 (2011) (observing that 
Congress’s intent presumably is reflected in the words it chooses to use in a statute). 
 361. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Original Understanding of the Political Status of Indian 
Tribes, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 153, 156 (2008). Professor Fletcher demonstrates that both before 
and after the Constitution was ratified, “the federal government . . . engage[d] in Indian affairs by 
dealing solely with Indian tribes and not individual Indians.” Id. at 172; see also id. at 170 (“The 
Executive branch continued engaging in treaty-making with Indian tribes, as opposed to seeking 
opportunities to purchase lands from individual Indian landholders.”). That practice continued 
through the adoption of the Reconstruction Amendments. Id. at 176. Sarah Krakoff explains that 
“[t]he political and the racial are therefore hopelessly intermingled in current legal definitions of 
tribes.” Sarah Krakoff, Inextricably Political: Race, Membership, and Tribal Sovereignty, 87 
WASH. L. REV. 1041, 1043 (2012). Thus, while the category “federally recognized Indian tribe” 
is certainly political, it also reflects the “racialized history” of the federal government’s 
relationship with Indians. Id. at 1132. Krakoff urges courts not to try to untangle the racial and 
political in Indian affairs because doing so is “more likely to entrench historical discrimination 
against indigenous peoples than to reverse it.” Id. 
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Singling out federally recognized Indian tribes for special 
treatment is constitutionally permissible. In Morton v. Mancari,362 
the Supreme Court upheld a Bureau of Indian Affairs hiring 
preference for members of federally recognized Indian tribes,363 and 
reiterated that federally recognized Indian tribes have a “unique legal 
status” affording Congress “plenary power . . . to legislate on [their] 
behalf.”364 The government’s authority to enact legislation 
specifically benefiting tribes, the Court held,365 is drawn from the 
Indian Commerce Clause366 and the President’s treaty power.367 The 
Supreme Court reaffirmed more recently that “Congress may fulfill 
its treaty obligations and its responsibilities to the Indian tribes by 
enacting legislation dedicated to their circumstances and needs.”368 
Professor Worthen went a step further and concluded that because, 
among other things, tribes have a unique legal status and the United 
States has traditionally interacted with tribes, not individual Indians, 
the Eagle Act’s preferential treatment of Indian tribes is normatively 
acceptable.369 
Even if we recognize that the Indian tribes exception is primarily 
a political accommodation, however, it obviously has a religious 
component insofar as it exempts only the “religious purposes” of 
Indian tribes. Since both the purpose and effect of the exception are 
primarily secular, however, that religious component introduces no 
constitutional infirmity. The Supreme Court has invalidated statutes 
for being insufficiently secular only when religion provided the 
primary purpose or constituted the principal effect of the 
enactment.370 Accordingly, the First Circuit appropriately relied on 
 
 362. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974). 
 363. See id. at 553 n.24. 
 364. Id. at 551, 553. 
 365. Id. at 551–52. 
 366. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 367. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 368. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 519 (2000). 
 369. Worthen, supra note 23, at 993, 1009, 1014–15. 
 370. See McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 864–65 (2005); Hernandez v. Comm’r, 
490 U.S. 680, 696 (1989) (“[A] statute primarily having a secular effect does not violate the 
Establishment Clause merely because it ‘happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of 
some or all religions.’” (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 422 (1961)); Lynch v. 
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 683 (1984) (“[N]ot every law that confers an indirect, remote, or 
incidental benefit upon [religion] is, for that reason alone, constitutionally invalid.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (citing Comm. for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 
U.S. 756, 771 (1973))). 
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Morton v. Mancari to reject an Establishment Clause challenge to the 
Eagle Act.371 
Viewing the Indian tribes exception as primarily a religious 
accommodation, on the other hand, would introduce a problem. 
Congress may accommodate particular religious needs without 
running afoul of the Constitution. The Supreme Court “has long 
recognized that the government may . . . accommodate religious 
practices . . . without violating the Establishment Clause.”372 
Preferences that are intended to “alleviate significant governmental 
interference” with the exercise of religion are constitutionally 
permissible.373 As Michael McConnell explained, a “legitimate 
accommodation . . . merely removes obstacles to the exercise of a 
religious conviction adopted for reasons independent of the 
government’s action.”374 Accommodating religious groups instead of 
individuals is also permissible.375 Indeed, in a seminal religious 
accommodation case, the Supreme Court upheld Title VII’s 
provision exempting religious organizations from the prohibition 
against employment discrimination based on religion.376 The Court 
 
 371. Rupert v. Dir., U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 957 F.2d 32, 34–35 (1st Cir. 1992); see also 
Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210, 1216–17 (5th Cir. 1991) 
(holding state law that prohibited peyote use except by members of recognized tribes did not 
violate the Establishment Clause). 
 372. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 713 (2005) (quoting Hobbie v. Unemployment 
Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 144–45 (1987)). 
 373. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. 
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987). 
 374. Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the 
Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 686 (1992); see also Zoe Robinson, Rationalizing Religious 
Exemptions: A Legislative Process Theory of Statutory Exemptions for Religion, 20 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 133 (2011) (applying a public choice model to conclude that statutory 
religious accommodations are animated by legislators’ self-interests and hence favor majoritarian 
interests). But see Lisa Schultz Bressman, Accommodation and Equal Liberty, 42 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1007, 1016 (2001) (arguing that McConnell’s view is erroneous because “the 
Establishment Clause . . . prohibit[s] the government from preferring religion to nonreligion for 
two basic reasons: to protect against government preference among religions and to recognize the 
importance of both religious and nonreligious values in a modern, pluralistic society”). 
 375. Cf. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 706 (2012) 
(“[T]he text of the First Amendment itself . . . gives special solicitude to the rights of religious 
organizations” and “protects a religious group’s right to shape its own faith and mission.”); id. at 
700, 705, 710 (holding the judicially created “ministerial exception,” which “precludes 
application of [employment discrimination laws] to claims concerning the employment 
relationship between a religious institution and its ministers,” barred the Americans with 
Disabilities Act claim of a “called” teacher at a religious school). But cf. Leslie Griffin, The Sins 
of Hosanna-Tabor, 88 IND. L.J. 981, 981 (2013) (criticizing Hosanna-Tabor for, inter alia, 
favoring religious institutions over individuals). 
 376. Amos, 483 U.S. at 330. 
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held that “it is a permissible legislative purpose to alleviate 
significant governmental interference with the ability of religious 
organizations to define and carry out their religious missions.”377 
The problem with viewing the Indian tribes exception as 
primarily a religious accommodation, however, is that the 
government cannot favor one religion over others.378 If the Indian 
tribes exception is primarily a religious accommodation, then the 
government must extend that accommodation to similarly situated 
religious groups,379 including the one million practitioners of Afro-
Caribbean religions that require eagles.380 Opening up the Indian 
tribes exception to people who are not members of federally 
recognized Indian tribes would increase wait times at the 
Repository.381 As Judge Kozinski explained, “If the government 
extended eligibility, every permit issued to a nonmember would be 
one fewer issued to a member. This is the inescapable result of a 
demand that exceeds a fixed supply.”382 The Repository already 
cannot meet the current demand.383 Increasing the number of eligible 
applicants would thus vitiate the government’s efforts to satisfy the 
needs of recognized tribes.384 Increased delays would be particularly 
problematic for theocratic tribes, like the Zuni, in which “all aspects 
of tribal life—including governance, social structures, justice 
systems, and culture—are infused with religious meaning.”385 
Issuing permits to tribes instead of individual tribal members 
would make what currently appears to be a religious exception for 
certain individuals look more like the primarily political 
 
 377. Id. at 335. 
 378. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982); see also Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 
720 (2005) (holding statutory test identical to RFRA must be “administered neutrally among 
different faiths”). 
 379. See Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. School Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 706–07 
(1994) (holding a statute creating a special school district using the lines for a village enclave of a 
particular form of Judaism violated the Establishment Clause); see also Church of the Lukumi 
Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533–36 (1993) (holding an animal cruelty 
ordinance that accommodated kosher slaughter, but not Santerian sacrifice, violated the Free 
Exercise Clause). 
 380. See supra Part II.A. 
 381. See Gibson v. Babbitt, 223 F.3d 1256, 1258 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam); United States 
v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274, 1293 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 382. United States v. Antoine, 318 F.3d 919, 923 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 383. Frosch, supra note 157 (explaining that “with 4,500 requests each year, the repository 
simply does not have enough eagles”). 
 384. Gibson, 223 F.3d at 1258; Wilgus, 638 F.3d at 1293 & n.9. 
 385. Angela R. Riley, (Tribal) Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 95 CAL. L. REV. 799, 845 (2007). 
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accommodation it was originally intended to be. It would no longer 
pit individual religious practitioners against other individual religious 
practitioners. Rather, it would pit individual religious practitioners 
against sovereign nations with whom the United States has a 
government-to-government relationship, thus alleviating, though 
certainly not abrogating, the inequitable tension in the Eagle Act case 
law. 
2.  Alleviating Burdens 
Granting permits to Indian tribes would alleviate some of the 
burden the permit process currently imposes on tribal religious 
practitioners. Implementing the first phase of my proposal would 
necessarily require tribes to develop administrative structures to 
distribute their share of the feathers or take permits, as the Hopi have 
already done. While this might not be an easy task for some tribes, it 
would give tribes an opportunity to tailor their regulatory 
requirements to their members’ needs and sensitivities, making the 
program “a closer cultural match.”386 For example, tribes might opt 
not to operate on a first-come, first-served basis, but instead to 
prioritize certain religious needs. Tribal members might still have to 
fill out application forms and wait for their requests to be filled, but 
at least they would not be making a personal, religious request to a 
federal agency. Rather, they would be making requests to people 
who share their culture. Hopefully, administering eagle permits at the 
tribal level will enhance tribal members’ sense of ownership in the 
program and result in a more effective regulatory program.387 
Turning the distribution of the eagle resource over to tribes 
would also remove the discomfort of empowering a federal agency to 
assess the bona fides of applicants’ religious beliefs. Tribal 
governments would be free to evaluate applicants’ sincerity and the 
validity of their religious tenets, so long as their organic laws do not 
forbid it.388 
 
 386. Rae, supra note 341, at 18; see also Gover, supra note 333, at 320 (“The diversity of 
tribal circumstances requires a policy that is sufficiently flexible to meet the diverse conditions 
and capabilities of the Tribes.”); id. at 359–60 (discussing the necessity of a customized trust 
administration). 
 387. Rae, supra note 341, at 19 (discussing empirical studies demonstrating that “self-
administered programs are more likely to succeed in generating the desired outcomes of the 
program”). 
 388. See generally Carpenter, Religious Freedoms, supra note 128 (arguing that tribes can 
protect individual religious freedoms in ways that reflect tribal norms and enhance sovereignty). 
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The second phase of my proposal would provide an opportunity 
to further alleviate the regulatory scheme’s burdens on tribes. For 
example, the tribes acting collectively could decide to allow tribal 
members to keep eagles they find instead of requiring them to turn 
those birds in to the Repository. They might decide to take over the 
operation of the Repository or replace the Repository with some 
other distributional mechanism. 
3.  Enhancing Regulatory Efficiency and Judicial Uniformity 
The long-term benefits of this regulatory change would justify 
the short-term burden on tribes and the FWS. The burden of 
implementing the Eagle Act permit system should be alleviated by 
cutting the number of potential applicants from over two million 
members of federally recognized tribes to only 566 tribal 
governments. Although the FWS has not received many requests for 
eagle take permits, it should be easier to protect the species’ viability 
if take permits are aggregated at the tribal level, rather than issued to 
individuals. 
Moreover, tribes that wish to participate in the eagle permitting 
system could be encouraged or required to develop tribal game 
codes, if they do not already exist. Those tribal codes could enhance 
federal law enforcement by making Lacey Act charges a viable 
alternative to the Eagle Act and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act.389 
Tribal law-enforcement capacity might grow, too, and provide even 
more assistance to federal enforcement officers than tribal authorities 
currently do. Ultimately, tribes might operate the Repository and 
take on the task of determining among themselves how to allocate 
the eagle resource with federal oversight to ensure species health. In 
short, enhanced tribal wildlife governance structures will supplement 
federal administration and could free up federal resources for other 
important wildlife priorities. 
Finally, directing the regulatory structure to tribes instead of 
individual tribal members could bring more uniformity to the case 
law. Refocusing the Indian tribes exception as a political 
 
Indian tribes are not subject to the U.S. Constitution. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896); 
Native American Church of North America v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131, 134 (10th 
Cir. 1959). Also, the Indian Civil Rights Act does not contain an Establishment Clause analog. 
See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(1) (2010). 
 389. See 16 U.S.C. § 3372 (2013). 
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accommodation would highlight its role in fulfilling the 
government’s trust and treaty obligations toward recognized tribes, 
making it more likely that the courts would recognize that as a 
compelling interest underlying the exception. This regulatory change 
also might alleviate some of the concern with inequity that may have 
inspired the Tenth Circuit in Hardman to impose a daunting 
evidentiary burden on the government. Instead, the courts of appeals, 
seeing eagles as a tribal property interest, might be more inclined 
toward the Ninth Circuit’s recognition in Antoine that RFRA does 
not authorize shifting burdens from one person onto others.390 
Similarly, this change would further distance the Eagle Act from O 
Centro’s concern about singling out particular religious claimants for 
special treatment.391 
C.  Implementation 
Designing a new regulatory system would require the 
knowledge, experience, and expertise of the FWS’s biologists and 
law enforcement officers, as well as tribal government 
representatives. No doubt, the logistics would be challenging. 
However, the system is not sustainable in the long-term as it is 
currently structured. The tensions the Eagle Act creates, as currently 
administered, threaten to pull the entire scheme apart. Without a 
viable regulatory system that protects eagles and accommodates 
tribal religion, neither will survive. 
Some questions will need to be answered in developing a new 
regulatory system.392 At the first stage of my proposal, amending the 
Eagle Act regulations to provide for issuing permits to tribes instead 
of individual tribal members, the stakeholders will have to determine 
how to allocate the eagle resource initially among federally 
recognized tribes and what to do with people who already are on the 
National Eagle Repository’s waiting list.393 One option is to allocate 
 
 390. See supra Part III.C. 
 391. See supra Part III.B. 
 392. The FWS could consider using a negotiated rulemaking process. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 561–70 
(2013); see generally Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Achieving Policymaking Consensus: The (Unfortunate) 
Waning of Negotiated Rulemaking, 49 S. TEX. L. REV. 987 (2008) (discussing the process and 
benefits of negotiated rulemaking). 
 393. To the extent that individuals on the waiting list have a vested interest in receiving 
feathers from the Repository that tribal governments may not compromise, the FWS may need to 
honor those pending requests to avoid unlawful retroactivity. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. 
 
114 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:53 
permits initially based on historic demand. For what are currently 
known as possession permits—that is, applications to receive eagles 
and eagle parts from the Repository—the number of applications 
members of each tribe have filed in the past, including applications 
that are already pending at the Repository, could be used to 
determine the initial allocation of tribal permits, and the burden 
could be placed on the tribes to justify a different allocation. As 
explained above,394 Carpenter, Katyal, and Riley’s theory of 
indigenous cultural property posits that “some cultural resources are 
so sacred and intimately connected to a people’s collective identity 
and experience that they deserve special consideration as a form of 
cultural property.”395 The new regulatory scheme could be built on 
the presumption that, if eagles are integral to a particular tribe’s 
identity, members of that tribe will have applied for parts from the 
Repository in the past, as the Repository is the only legal source for 
new eagles and feathers. There may be many reasons, however, why 
a particular tribe’s members did not apply to the Repository; perhaps 
the long wait or the quality of the feathers would not have satisfied 
those individuals’ religious needs. Thus, allocating possession 
permits to tribes is not so simple as counting past applications. 
The allocation of permits to take live eagles would be even more 
complex because historic demand cannot be determined based solely 
on federal permit applications. Before the Tenth Circuit decided 
United States v. Friday in 2008, the FWS had issued only a handful 
of permits to take golden eagles because the availability of take 
permits was not widely known.396 Nonetheless, tribes whose 
members have applied for take permits in the past could be given 
priority in the initial allocation of tribal take permits because their 
past applications demonstrate that taking live eagles is integral to the 
tribe’s identity. An added complication for eagle take permits is the 
geographic element. Unlike dead eagles and their parts, which can be 
distributed nationwide, populations of live eagles that are healthy 
enough to withstand permitted takes are concentrated in certain 
areas. For example, when the FWS issued a take permit to the 
 
Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988); Nat’l Mining Assoc. v. Dept. of Labor, 292 F.3d 849, 859 (D.C. Cir. 
2002). 
 394. See text accompanying notes 266-274. 
 395. Carpenter et al., supra note 29, at 1028. 
 396. United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 945 (10th Cir. 2008) (“The permit process is used 
infrequently, and is not widely known.”). 
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Chairman of the Northern Arapaho Tribe’s Business Council, it 
specified that the eagles could not be taken on the Tribe’s 
reservation.397 
Issuing Eagle Act permits to tribes will also necessitate 
identifying which tribal entity will apply for the permit and distribute 
the tribe’s share of eagles among its members. The tribes should be 
given an adequate amount of time and support, both technical and 
financial, to develop the required administrative structures, but the 
tribes themselves should decide how to accomplish these tasks. 
Giving the tribes that responsibility, however, raises another 
significant question that the stakeholders designing the new 
regulatory system will have to answer: What happens when a 
particular tribe is not up to the task? Should the Department of the 
Interior administer the Eagle Act permit program for it? 
At the second stage of my proposal, when a sufficient number of 
tribes have developed the governance structures necessary to 
administer the permit system, the tribes acting collectively could be 
empowered to, among other things, define who is entitled to take and 
possess eagles and for what purposes, how they may be obtained, 
transferred, and disposed, and how the initial allocation of permits 
should be changed. In the language of Carpenter, Katyal, and Riley’s 
cultural property theory, the tribes would be enabled to define the 
parameters of the stewardship regime for eagles.398 Similarly, Kristen 
Johnson’s and Sheila Foster’s community governance models 
suggest that the tribes would create and manage an institution for 
administering the Indian tribes exception, overseen by the FWS.399 
 
 397. See Judge Rules Against Tribe in Bald Eagle Case, EENEWS.NET, (Nov. 7, 2012), http:// 
www.eenews.net/Greenwire/print/2012/11/07/18; Ben Neary, Northern Arapaho Tribe: Bald 
Eagle Permit a Victory for Tradition, HUFFINGTON POST, (Mar. 17, 2012, 10:20 AM), http:// 
www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/17/northern-arapaho-tribe-bald-eagle_n_1355335.html; 
Northern Arapaho Tribe Labels Federal Eagle Permit a Sham, INDIANZ.COM, (Apr. 5, 2012), 
http://64.38.12.138/News/2012/005200.asp. 
 398. See Carpenter et al., supra note 29, at 1086. 
 399. See Johnson, supra note 30, at 244; Foster, supra note 30, at 88–91. Elinor Ostrom 
concluded that self-governing common-pool resource management systems that have endured 
over time share certain characteristics: they have “clearly defined boundaries”; the rules 
governing appropriation and provision of the resource are tailored to local conditions; resource 
users who are affected by the rules can participate in modifying them; the system includes 
effective monitoring, graduated sanctions, and conflict-resolution mechanisms; the government 
recognizes the right of resource users to establish the rules for the resource; and all of these 
features “are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises.” OSTROM, supra note 30, at 90–
102. The stakeholders should pay attention to these factors in fleshing out the details of my 
proposal. 
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As Indian-law scholars urge, this stage of my proposal would go part 
of the way toward recognizing tribes’ inherent sovereign right to 
manage a resource that is central to the cultural identity of many 
tribes.400 Given the great variation in tribal religious practices, the 
tribes acting collectively might decide to leave many of these 
decisions to individual tribes or to the FWS.401 Ultimately, however, 
that is a decision the tribes themselves should make. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The imbalance between the supply and the religious demand for 
eagles is growing and may soon reach a breaking point. The system 
must change if eagles and tribal religion are to survive. This Article 
proposes to pick some “low-hanging fruit” by amending the FWS 
regulations to issue Eagle Act take and possession permits to 
federally recognized Indian tribes instead of to individual tribal 
members, and eventually to go further and enable the tribes 
themselves to define the contours of the Indian tribes exception. 
These changes will alleviate much of the tension in the current 
regulatory scheme and yield benefits for tribes, for the federal 
government, and for eagles. It is my sincere hope that this Article 
will spur further discussion and lead to lasting, positive change.  
 
 400. See, e.g., Washburn, supra note 31, at 782. 
 401. Cf. Gover, supra note 333, at 333 (emphasizing that, given tribal wariness of efforts to 
reduce federal responsibility for trust resources, “[t]he challenge for current policy makers is to 
find a formula that leaves the tribes feeling secure in the federal-tribal relationship even as the 
federal role is reduced and tribal self-governance strengthened”). 
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